REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA
HIGH COURT OF NAMIBIA, MAIN DIVISION, WINDHOEK | |||
JUDGMENT | |||
Case number: HC-MD-CIV-MOT-EXP-2024/00034 INT-HC-INTERP-2024/00401 | |||
In the matter between: | |||
RUDOLF WOLDEMAR WINCKLER | APPLICANT | ||
and | |||
ANNELIE BARNARD N.O. | 1st RESPONDENT | ||
JOHANNES HENDRIK SNYMAN N.O. | 2nd RESPONDENT | ||
Neutral citation: | Winckler v Barnard N.O. (HC-MD-CIV-MOT-EXP-2024/00034) [2025] NAHCMD 200 (25 April 2025) | ||
Coram: | DE JAGER J | ||
Heard: | 14 March 2025 | ||
Delivered: | 25 April 2025 | ||
Flynote: Rescission – Ex parte orders – Rule 103(1)(a) – Ex parte orders are not final despite their form not including a rule nisi or a return date – Proper interpretation of ‘any order or judgment’ envisaged in rule 103(1)(a) includes simple interlocutory orders – Facts permitting, rescission of ex parte orders may be brought under rule 103(1)(a) notwithstanding their provisional nature and the procedures provided under rules 72(4) and 72(7) – The phrase ‘granted in the absence of any party affected thereby’ in rule 103(1)(a) entails two requirements namely a party’s absence and an error by the court – Ex parte orders granted on proper procedure for ex parte applications mandated by the court rules and supported by the cases’ nature and which remain provisional while the affected parties could return to court to have the ex parte applications considered in their presence but opted not to are not orders sought or granted in their absence for the purpose of rule 103(1)(a) – Orders to which parties were procedurally entitled when they were issued cannot be rescinded under rule 103(1)(a) absent the existence of facts at that time of which the court was unaware that would have precluded them being granted.
Summary: The applicant seeks to have court orders finding or confirming jurisdiction obtained in ex parte proceedings (the orders) rescinded under rule 103(1)(a) because they were allegedly erroneously sought or granted in his absence while he was affected by them. The applicant’s case is as follows. The orders were granted as final orders in an ex parte application. He was never given notice of the application. The respondents failed to obtain a rule nisi, and the orders were made final on the day the application was heard. Lastly, the cost order on which the orders were based was subsequently abandoned, and there was no longer any basis for the court to find or confirm jurisdiction. The respondents’ case is as follows. The orders are not final orders that can be rescinded because the applicant could return to court to have the ex parte application considered in his presence. A rescission application cannot be brought against an order that is not final. Nothing was sought or granted erroneously.
Held that, the court orders were not final because, since they were obtained ex parte, they were by their nature only provisional despite their form not including a rule nisi or a return date.
Held that, the phrase ‘any order or judgment’ in rule 103(1)(a), properly interpreted, includes simple interlocutory orders, including the orders sought to be rescinded.
Held that, facts permitting, the applicant could bring a rescission application of the orders under rule 103(1)(a) notwithstanding their provisional nature and the procedures provided under rules 72(4) and 72(7).
Held that, the phrase ‘granted in the absence of any party affected thereby’ in rule 103(1)(a) entails two requirements, namely a party’s absence (not necessarily actual or physical absence) and an error by the court.
Held that, the orders were not granted in the applicant’s absence as envisaged in rule 103(1)(a) because they were obtained by the respondents after having followed proper procedure by bringing the application on an ex parte basis, under a procedure mandated by the court rules and supported by the case’s nature, and since the orders remained provisional even without a rule nisi or a return date, the applicant could return to court to have the ex parte application considered in his presence but he opted not to do so.
Held that, the orders were not erroneously sought or granted because at the time of their issue, the respondents were procedurally entitled to them and the applicant failed to show that at that time, there existed a fact that the court was unaware of but that would have precluded the granting of the orders and which would have induced the court not to grant them. Events after the orders were issued cannot change the orders to ones erroneously sought or granted.
Held that, the applicant is not allowed to change the application from one brought under rule 103(1)(a) to one brought to have the orders set aside on other bases as envisaged in rules 72(4) or 72(7) as it will prejudice the respondents, and the issues were not fully canvassed for a hearing under those rules.
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ORDER
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The rescission application dated 4 July 2024 under INT-HC-INTERP-2024/00401 is dismissed.
The applicant in that application must pay the respondents’ costs occasioned by that application, including the costs of one instructing and one instructed legal practitioner, capped under rule 32(11).
The matter under INT-HC-INTERP-2024/00401 is finalised and removed from the roll.
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JUDGMENT
_______________________________________________________________
DE JAGER J:
In the notice of motion dated 4 July 2024, the applicant, Rudolf Woldemar Winckler, prays that the court order dated 9 February 2024, as varied on 25 March 2024 (the orders), be rescinded under rule 103(1)(a) and that the respondents pay the application’s costs, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved. During oral argument, the applicant’s counsel prayed that the notice of motion be read without specific reference to rule 103(1)(a). The respondents, Annelie Barnard N.O. and Johannes Hendrik Snyman N.O., in their capacities as the trustees for the time being of the La-Di-Da Trust, oppose the application.
The orders originated from the following facts. On 18 August 2022, the respondents instituted an interlocutory proceeding under HC-MD-CIV-ACT-CON-2021/03483 for the applicant to be joined as a defendant in that action. In the applicant’s answering affidavit to that application, he raised the court’s lack of jurisdiction over him as a point in limine. The respondents eventually decided not to proceed with the joinder application. That election was recorded in a court order dated 11 September 2023, and a cost order was made against the respondents in the applicant’s favour. On 9 April 2024, the applicant was served with a supplementary founding affidavit in the joinder application. From the annexures to those papers, he noticed a varied court order dated 25 March 2024 whereby the Windhoek deputy sheriff was authorised to attach for purposes of founding, alternatively, confirming jurisdiction, the 11 September 2023 cost order. According to the applicant, service of the supplementary founding affidavit on 9 April 2024 was the first time he became aware of the varied court order. The original 9 February 2024 court order was not part of that supplementary founding affidavit, and he only became aware of the 9 February 2024 court order on 8 May 2024 after his legal practitioners obtained it from e-Justice, so he said. He stated he was surprised that the orders were granted in his absence without him having had an opportunity to give any input before they became final.
The applicant proceeded to note an appeal against the orders, and since, according to the applicant, the appeal suspended their operation, he abandoned the 11 September 2023 cost order. Following rule 61 (irregular) proceedings by the respondents against the notice of appeal, the notice of appeal was withdrawn, and the applicant brought the instant rescission application.
The applicant’s case is that, for the following reasons, the orders were erroneously sought or granted in his absence as an affected party. The original 9 February 2024 court order was granted as a final order in an ex parte application. He was never given notice of the ex parte application. The respondents did not comply with the usual way applications for attachments are brought to find or confirm jurisdiction because a rule nisi was not issued, and the attachment was made final on the day the application was heard. The applicant submitted the same applied to the varied court order of 25 March 2024. Lastly, he contended that since the cost order was abandoned, there was no longer any basis for the court to find or confirm jurisdiction.
The respondents’ case is as follows. The orders are not final orders that can be rescinded because the applicant has the right to return to court to have the ex parte application considered in his presence. A rescission application cannot be brought against an order that is not final. Nothing was sought or granted erroneously. The notice of appeal was a nullity and did not suspend the orders. The joinder application was not finalised. It was only removed from the roll so it could be supplemented and re-enrolled when opportune. The orders were served on the applicant before 9 April 2024.
There are returns of service on record that the orders were served on the applicant before 9 April 2024, but the applicant alleged they did not come to his attention at the time.
Rule 103(1)(a) provides that, in addition to the powers it may have, the court may of its own initiative or on the application of any party affected brought within a reasonable time, rescind or vary any order or judgment erroneously sought or erroneously granted in the absence of any party affected thereby.
Based on the respondents’ opposition, the first question is whether the orders are final.
Neither of the orders included a rule nisi or a return date. They appear to be final on their faces, but they are not. It is common cause that they were obtained ex parte. As a result, in law, they are by their nature only provisional, irrespective of their form. That is so because once contested, and the court reconsiders the matter, the applicant will be in no better position than he was when the orders were first sought.1 That is the position even in the absence of a rule nisi or a return date as in the instant case.2
Although it was not the applicant’s initial position, during oral argument, his counsel (correctly) conceded that the orders are not final.
The application is determined on the basis that the orders are not final.
Based on the respondents’ opposition, the fact that the orders are not final, and the applicant may return to court to have the ex parte application considered in his presence, the next question is whether the orders can be rescinded. From that question, the further question arises whether rule 103(1)(a) applies to orders that are not final. According to the applicant, there is no authority that an interlocutory order cannot be rescinded under that rule. The respondents’ position is that rule 103 only applies to final orders because it operates as an exception to the functus officio principle that does not apply to provisional orders.
The words ‘order’ and ‘judgment’ are not defined in the rules or the High Court Act 16 of 1990 (the Act). The court was not referred to any authority holding that rule 103 is limited to final orders or that an interlocutory order cannot be rescinded under that rule. For the following reasons, the court does not agree with the respondents’ position that rule 103 only applies to final orders.
The general rule under the common law is that courts have no authority to amend their own final orders. The rationale is that courts would be functus officio, and the principle of finality in litigation dictates that the courts’ power should end. There are several exceptions to the functus officio principle. Some of them are found in rule 103. Another exception is simple interlocutory orders, but the functus officio principle does not apply to such orders, and they stand on a different footing for being open to reconsideration, variation or rescission on good cause shown.3 The exceptions are grounded on at least two interrelated considerations. First, the need to do justice, and second, the need to adapt the common law to changing times and circumstances. There appears to be a distinction between orders to which rule 103 applies and simple interlocutory orders. That, however, does not mean that simple interlocutory orders cannot be rescinded under rule 103. The fact that the functus officio principle does not apply to simple interlocutory orders does not mean that rule 103 does not apply to them, as the respondents contended in their heads of argument. The plain wording of rule 103 does not support the argument that rule 103 does not apply to simple interlocutory orders. Rule 103 refers to ‘any order or judgment’. Those words have been said to be used in the sense of ‘the pronouncement of the disposition’ in that there must be a distinct application by one of the parties for definite relief. The word ‘any’ in rule 103(1) presupposes something wider than ‘judgment or order’ used in section 18 of the Act. The court finds that, facts permitting, a proper interpretation of rule 103(1) includes simple interlocutory orders.
In Government of Namibia and Others v Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd4 the court dealt with the variation of an interim interdictory order in the form of a discharge application. The court examined various authorities and concluded that, provided the order sought to be varied is a simple interlocutory order, the court has an inherent jurisdiction to discharge or vary it. It continued to state it would be impossible to list the circumstances when such jurisdiction would be employed, but it may be done in respect of purely procedural or incidental matters, where the substratum or reason why the order was granted disappeared due to new facts arising since it was granted. Although new facts are not a prerequisite for the inherent jurisdiction to be exercised, cases where no new facts are available would seldom arise, so the court said. It further said the inherent jurisdiction would be employed on good cause shown or when justice demands it, but sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. Lastly, whether the circumstances should move the court to exercise the inherent jurisdiction and how the existing order should be affected (reviewed, discharged or altered) would fall in the court’s discretion.
Guided by the principle of stare decisis, and even though the respondents’ counsel wrote Government of Namibia and Others v Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd while he was an acting judge, the court can only depart from it if satisfied it was clearly wrong. On the contrary, the court agrees with the position set out therein. It is also pointed out that the applicant’s counsel relied on it.
In the instant case, the court is not dealing with its inherent jurisdiction. It addresses its power to rescind any order or judgment under rule 103(1)(a) and whether the orders sought to be rescinded fall within the ambit of that rule. Considering Government of Namibia and Others v Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd in that context and that the court therein regarded an interim interdict as a simple interlocutory order and further considering the nature of the orders in the instant case (which are provisional at this stage), the court, for purposes of this application, regards them as simple interlocutory orders. Given the plain wording of rule 103(1), which refers to ‘any order or judgment’, the court considers the orders as ‘any order’ envisaged in rule 103(1).
Before dealing with the requirements of rule 103(1)(a), the court considers whether the applicant could bring the application under that rule instead of applying for leave to oppose the ex parte application under rule 72(4) or anticipating it under rule 72(7).
Rule 72(4) provides that any person having an interest which may be affected by a decision on an application brought ex parte may deliver notice of an application for leave to oppose, supported by an affidavit setting out the nature of that interest and the grounds on which he desires to be heard, after which the registrar must docket-allocate the matter to a managing judge who must set it down for hearing. Rule 72(7) provides that any person against whom an order is granted ex parte may anticipate the return day on delivery of not less than 24 hours’ notice.
In Assegaai and Others v Prosecutor-General and Others5 the court held it had no power to rescind a preservation order because the rescission application was brought under rule 103 and not section 58 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 29 of 2004. The court stated that where a statute provides for a particular procedure, a litigant may not bypass or ignore that prescribed procedure and instead base an application on another subordinate statutory provision with a similar procedure. It further stated that section 58(6) of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 29 of 2004 stipulates that a preservation order may not be varied or rescinded on any grounds other than those provided in section 58.
In the instant case, the procedures under rules 72(4), 72(7) and 103(1)(a) derive from the same court rules. However, the nature of those procedures is different, different considerations apply in adjudicating them, and they cater for different needs. The procedures under rules 72(4) and 72(7) may include the merits of the matter, while the procedure under rule 103(1)(a) is limited to whether a party was procedurally entitled to an order when it was sought or granted without considering the case's merits. For those reasons, and whereas there is no statutory bar on the applicant bringing a rescission application under rule 103(1)(a) instead of following the procedures provided under rule 72(4) or 72(7), there is no reason why the applicant should be precluded from having followed rule 103(1)(a). Clegg v Priestley6 is one example where an ex parte order granted without a rule nisi was rescinded under Uniform Rule 42(1)(a) (the provisions of which are the same as rule 103(1)(a)).
The court finds that the applicant was entitled to bring the rescission application under rule 103(1)(a). However, it is a different question whether the case facts permitted it and could result in success.
The court now considers whether the application should succeed under rule 103(1)(a).
Applications under rule 103(1) must be brought within a reasonable time. Whereas the timing within which the application was brought was not placed in issue, and in the spirit of the rules’ overriding objective, the application is determined on the basis that it was brought within a reasonable time. However, that approach should not be seen as a precedent that three months is a reasonable time to bring an application under rule 103(1)(a).
The phrase ‘granted in the absence of any party affected thereby’ in rule 103(1)(a) exists to protect litigants whose presence was precluded and not those afforded a procedurally regular judicial process but opted to be absent. The phrase entails two requirements. Firstly, it entails a party’s absence. That absence does not necessarily mean actual or physical absence. It relates to whether proper procedure was followed so a party could be present. Secondly, it entails an error by the court.7
The applicant contended that an order granted without notice to a party that may be prejudiced stands to be set aside under rule 103(1)(a). The applicant relies on a case that did not concern an ex parte application,8 hence it does not assist his case at all. The applicant’s first problem is that the application was brought ex parte. Ex parte applications are a procedure mandated by the court rules. For rule 103(1)(a), it would thus not matter that the applicant was not notified about the application. The applicant’s second problem lies in the case’s nature. The case’s nature supports the use of an ex parte procedure. Attachment applications to find or confirm jurisdiction are, by their nature, usually brought ex parte. Due to the nature of the relief sought in the ex parte application, the respondents were procedurally entitled to obtain the orders on an ex parte basis. At the time, the court had no jurisdiction over the applicant. Therefore, no papers could be served on him in a foreign country before establishing the court’s jurisdiction. Also, considering the basis of the application, notice to the applicant would have defeated its object as the applicant could have abandoned the cost order before the application was heard.
Thus, there was nothing wrong with the respondents approaching the court on an ex parte basis and the court granting the orders on that basis. As such, the court made no error in granting the orders. The orders resulted from a procedurally regular judicial process, not one where the applicant’s presence was irregularly precluded. Moreover, the rules provided that the applicant could seek leave to oppose the application under rule 72(4) or anticipate it under rule 72(7), but he opted not to do so. The fact that the orders did not include a return date did not preclude the applicant from anticipating the case.9 Therefore, the applicant’s absence when the orders were granted does not fall within the scope of rule 103(1)(a). In other words, the applicant’s absence when the orders were granted, does not qualify as the absence required under rule 103(1)(a).
Since, in law, the orders remained provisional regardless of their form, even without a rule nisi or a return date, their form cannot result in them being erroneously sought or granted.
The applicant’s case does not meet the requirements of rule 103(1)(a) for another reason. The applicant failed to demonstrate that the orders were erroneously sought or granted because he failed to show that at the time of their issue, there existed a fact that the court was unaware of but that would have precluded the granting of the orders, and which would have induced the court not to grant them. One of the principles governing rescissions under rule 103(1)(a) is that it caters for a mistake in the proceedings, which mistake may either be one appearing on the record or one which subsequently becomes apparent from information made available in the rescission application but an order cannot be said to have been sought or granted erroneously in light of a subsequently disclosed defence which was not known or raised at the time the order is made. The error may arise either in the process of seeking the judgment on an applicant's part or in the process of granting it on the court’s part.10 In other words, an order to which a party was procedurally entitled cannot be considered to have been granted erroneously because of facts the court was unaware of when granting it. Events after the orders were issued cannot change the orders to ones erroneously sought or granted.
For the same reason, the applicant’s reliance on Knouwds NO v Josea and Another11 does not assist his case. Firstly, a rescission application does not serve the same function as the return date of a rule nisi, as the applicant’s counsel contended. Knouwds NO v Josea and Another was decided on the return date of a rule nisi and not in the context of a rule 103(1)(a) application. Different considerations apply in adjudicating those scenarios. A rule 103(1)(a) application concerns whether the party was procedurally entitled to the order when it was made. On a return date, the question is whether the provisional order should be confirmed. The application is considered afresh at such a hearing, and the enquiry may include issues beyond procedure. In Knouwds NO v Josea and Another, the respondents opposed the confirmation of the rule nisi on various grounds, one of which was that the provisional order was not served on them. The provisional order included an order that the rule nisi be served. The court said that the argument that all the applicant was required to do was only to serve the rule nisi without the founding papers (because the provisional order only referred to service of the court order) presented fundamental problems because to require service of only a court order was, in the court’s view, inherently unfair and unjust. The court further said it had not the slightest doubt that if it was brought to the court’s attention that all that was sought was service of the court order only and not the entire application, the court’s attitude would have been different. In that case, the court order was not served on the first respondent at all. Because of a total lack of service on the return date of a status matter, the rule nisi in Knouwds NO v Josea and Another was discharged.
Knouwds NO v Josea and Another is distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. The court is dealing with a rule 103(1)(a) application, not a return date hearing. As such, the enquiry relates to the procedure when the orders were granted and not whether the provisional order should be confirmed. Therefore, what happened after the provisional order was granted is irrelevant. Considering Knouwds NO v Josea and Another, the applicant’s entire basis of his complaint is irrelevant. If a matter is before court on a return date hearing and a final order is granted in an ex parte application which was not served on a respondent whose rights are affected thereby, such order would be rescindable albeit under rule 103(1)(a),12 but that is not the case before court.
The cost order forming the basis of the orders was not abandoned when the orders were granted. Again, the respondents were procedurally entitled to the orders at the time. An order to which a party was procedurally entitled cannot be rescinded under rule 103(1)(a).13 That is so because the phrase ‘erroneously sought or erroneously granted’ in that rule relates to the procedure followed to obtain the judgment in the absence of another party.
The court is not aware of any authority, nor was such authority provided, that an ex parte order must be in the form of a rule nisi with a return date or that it must include an order that the court order must be served together with the notice of motion and all supporting papers. The trite legal position that ex parte orders are, by their nature, only provisional regardless their form, does not support the applicant’s argument that the orders must have been in the form of a rule nisi with a return date or that it must include an order that the court order must be served together with the notice of motion and all supporting papers, lest it would be an order erroneously sought or granted. As such, the orders cannot be rescinded on those bases under rule 103(1)(a).
The court finds that the orders were not erroneously sought or granted.
During oral argument, when engaged about the procedure adopted by the applicant to bring the matter to court, the applicant’s counsel contended that a rescission is sought, but not specifically under rule 103(1)(a) and that the notice of motion should be read without the reference to that rule. He argued that the applicant is before court, and it does not matter that the application was brought under rule 103(1)(a) instead of an application to discharge the orders or set them aside, because the same grounds would have been raised and the application should be seen as an application to set the orders aside, not necessarily under rule 103(1)(a). As such, the applicant attempted to change the application’s identity, and the court suggested that such an approach would prejudice the respondents. The applicant’s counsel disagreed because, as he argued, the applicant would have raised the same issues. That may be so, but the basis for deciding the issues differs, and different considerations apply in adjudicating a rule 103(1)(a) application than in an application to have the orders set aside on a different basis. The main consideration in a rule 103(1)(a) application is whether a party was procedurally entitled to the order at the time without considering the case’s merits. If brought on another basis, it may include the case’s merits.
Allowing the applicant to change the application’s identity would no doubt prejudice the respondents. The respondents came to court to meet a case based on rule 103(1)(a). If the application’s identity is changed as prayed, the case the respondents must meet would be materially different. The respondents pointed out that the service issue, which occurred after the orders were granted, was not raised in the founding papers and cannot be raised for the first time in the heads of argument. For obvious reasons, it must have been raised in the founding papers to enable the respondents to deal with it in their answering papers to support counterarguments to the applicant’s argument based on Knouwds NO v Josea and Another with relevant facts. The other issue which would be impacted by whether it is raised in a rule 103(1)(a) application as opposed to a return date hearing is the allegation that the cost order was abandoned and there is no longer any basis for the court to find or confirm jurisdiction. In the context of a rule 103(1)(a) application, the question will be what the position was when the orders were granted. In the context of a return date hearing, factual and legal issues will arise from the allegation that the cost order was abandoned. Those facts were not fully canvassed in the papers filed of record simply because it was not the applicant’s case until the date of the hearing. Furthermore, the court was not given the benefit of legal argument on the legal position if the cost order was subsequently abandoned and the application is to be heard on a basis other than rule 103(1)(a). In the applicant’s heads of argument, it was expressly stated that the merits of the principal matter are irrelevant, yet during oral argument, the applicant wanted to widen the application’s spectrum. In those circumstances, the court does not allow the applicant to change the application’s identity at the eleventh hour, and the application cannot succeed.
There is no reason why the general rule on costs following the event should not apply. In their heads of argument, both sides contended that costs should be uncapped under rule 32(11). During oral argument, the applicant’s stance was changed. His counsel submitted that the application is interlocutory and the applicant is not seeking ‘special costs’, which the court understood meant that he was not seeking an uncapped cost order. No facts were advanced in the affidavits on why rule 32(11) should not apply. In the court’s view, the case facts do not merit an exception to rule 32(11).
In conclusion, it is ordered that:
The rescission application dated 4 July 2024 under INT-HC-INTERP-2024/00401 is dismissed.
The applicant in that application must pay the respondents’ costs occasioned by that application, including the costs of one instructing and one instructed legal practitioner, capped under rule 32(11).
The matter under INT-HC-INTERP-2024/00401 is finalised and removed from the roll.
__________________ |
B DE JAGER |
Judge |
APPEARANCES | |
APPLICANT: | P Barnard Instructed by Kloppers Legal Practitioners Windhoek |
RESPONDENT: | R Heathcote SC (with him J Jacobs) Instructed by Ellis Shilengudwa Incorporated Windhoek |
1 Prosecutor-General v Lameck and Others 2010 (1) NR 156 (HC) para 4.
2 Shalli v Attorney-General and Another 2013 (3) NR 613 (HC) para 36.
3 Zondi v MEC, Traditional and Local Government Affairs, and Others 2006 (3) SA 1 (CC) paras 28 to 30.
4 Government of Namibia and Others v Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd 2010 (2) NR 537 (HC).
5 Assegaai and Others v Prosecutor-General and Others 2020 (1) NR 25 (HC) para 36.
6 Clegg v Priestley 1985 (3) SA 950 (W).
7 Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Section Including Organs of State 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC) paras 56, 57 and 60.
8 Fraind v Nothmann 1991 (3) SA 837 (W) and Fernandes v Baleia Do Mar Industrial Safety Supplies CC and Others (HC-MD-CIV-MOT-GEN 204 of 2017) [2018] NAHCMD 337 (17 October 2018).
9 The Namibian Competition Commission v Puma Energy (Namibia) (Pty) Ltd (HC-MD-CIV-MOT-EXP-2016/00275) [2018] NAHCMD 356 (8 November 2018) para 48(a).
10 Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape) 2003 (6) SA 1 (SCA) and Lodhi 2 Properties Investments CC and Another v Bondev Developments (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 87 (SCA).
11 Knouwds NO v Josea and Another 2007 (2) NR 792 (HC).
12 Clegg v Priestly 1985 (3) SA 950 (W).
13 Freedom Stationery (Pty) Ltd and Others v Hassam and Others 2019 (4) SA 459 (SCA) paras 18 and 25.
Cited documents 4
Act 2
| 1. | High Court Act, 1990 | 1145 citations |
| 2. | Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 2004 | 380 citations |