Reasons for order:
DE JAGER J:
This ruling concerns the extension of a period post-judgment and the reasons for refusing a request to postpone the extension application. On 19 June 2024, the court ordered the Deputy Sheriff for the Outjo District (the first applicant) to formally offer a certain farm for sale to the Minister of Agriculture, Water and Land Reform (the first respondent) within ten days from the date of that order. In the notice of motion to the instant extension application, the first applicant and the second applicant (Capx Finance Namibia (Pty) Ltd) pray that the ten-day period in that order be varied and extended to 60 days from the date of this order, alternatively, as soon as is reasonably possible. The first respondent did not oppose the main application nor the extension application, but it was opposed by the second to the fifth respondents (W. S. Trading and Investment CC, Elias Jeja, Alexine Alexia Jeja and Elton Jeja, respectively). The second to the fifth respondents are collectively referred to as the respondents. The third, fourth and fifth respondents each hold 30 per cent of the members’ interest in the second respondent, while Hendrik Christian holds the remaining 10 per cent.
The applicants’ case is as follows. It was impossible for the first applicant to comply with the ten-day period in paragraph 1 of the 19 June 2024 court order because of the following reasons. Following the 19 June 2024 court order, the applicants proceeded to instruct Pieter Kotzé, who was also the agent dealing with the initial waiver application in 2022, to again compile and lodge a waiver application in compliance with the 19 June 2024 court order on the first applicant’s behalf. Upon liaising with Kotzé, it was realised that the ten-day period provides insufficient time for compliance with the court order. The previous offer to the first respondent was made on 28 July 2022. Since then, the Jeja family had access to the farm, removed items and structures, and prohibited the first applicant’s agents from accessing the farm. An offer to the first respondent must be accompanied by a declaration under oath confirming the improvements listed are on the farm. Such a declaration cannot be made without a visit to the farm, which visit would probably be frustrated by the respondents. The requirements of the documentation that must be submitted with an offer have changed since 2022. All accompanying documents must now be certified as original copies not older than three months. Those documents include certified copies of the Jeja family’s identity documents, which they would probably not provide. A land tax clearance certificate valid until 31 March 2025 must also be obtained, and that takes at least a month, if not longer. According to Kotzé, obtaining such a certificate often takes up to 60 court days. Without those documents, the offer cannot be submitted because the officials do not accept applications that do not comply with the formal requirements. About 60 days are required to comply with the new requirements. Kotzé said he could only pay the land tax on 23 September 2024. Between 8 and 10 October 2024, he was provided with the land tax clearance certificate issued on 6 June 2024 and paid for by the respondents or their agent. It was then established that a Mr Geiseb offered the farm for sale to the first respondent on 8 August 2024 on behalf of the respondents, while the farm no longer belongs to them, so he said. He was informed by an employee of the first respondent that the respondents’ offer must first be returned before the first applicant could lodge an application. Kotzé was informed that the first respondent sent Geiseb a letter stating that the respondents’ offer was illegal and instructed him to collect his documents. On 25 October 2024, Kotzé submitted the offer on the first applicant’s behalf. As such, the farm was not offered to the first respondent within ten days of the 19 June 2024 court order.
The respondents oppose the application on the following bases. The ten-day period lapsed on 3 July 2024. The extension application was instituted on 24 October 2024. One can only request an extension of time before the time limit lapses and the applicants fail to seek condonation for the late filing of the said application. The respondents rely on rules 54 and 55 to contend that the application is ipso facto barred, and the court is incompetent to grant an extension of time as the period expired and the bar is not uplifted.
The applicants previously instituted an application for directions dated 28 June 2024 seeking an extension of time and or variation of the 16 June 2024 court order, but that application was struck out with costs on 24 September 2024, primarily because the document filed in support of that application as an affidavit was not an affidavit as it was only signed by the deponent thereto and not by a commissioner of oaths. The court thereupon gave directions for the applicants to bring the instant extension application on or before 29 October 2024, which the applicants complied with. The answering and replying affidavits were also filed as directed by the court, followed by heads of argument for the applicants as well as the respondents. On 4 December 2024, the case was postponed to 3 February 2025 for hearing.
On 3 February 2025, the respondents sought a postponement from the bar without prior notice and without a substantive application. The reason for the postponement request was that they wanted legal representation. That was after the respondents had represented themselves from the inception of their opposition to the main application. Christian was their spokesperson, and he also represented the second respondent by virtue of a resolution by it. Notwithstanding the respondents’ unprocedural conduct in seeking a postponement on the hearing date of 3 February 2025 without prior notice and without a substantive application and notwithstanding the applicants’ opposition thereto, the matter was postponed to 18 February 2025 for Nafimane Halweendo to appear in court for a new hearing date to be allocated. Halweendo was the respondents’ legal practitioner of choice. On 18 February 2025, Halweendo appeared on behalf of the respondents, and the court gave directions for the delivery of supplementary heads of argument, and the case was set down and postponed to 28 April 2025 for hearing.
On 28 April 2025, the respondents appeared without Halweendo. The third respondent informed the court that Halweendo telephoned him around 21h00 the previous day and said he would not appear in court on their behalf the next day as he was not placed in funds. The third respondent further informed the court that they arranged with a third party for funds but would only get it that day (28 April 2025) or the following day. The respondents again sought a postponement from the bar without prior notice and without a substantive application. Naturally, the applicants opposed the request. On 28 April 2025, the court refused the postponement request and indicated that reasons will be provided in this ruling.
The court has a discretion whether to grant a postponement. The discretion must be exercised judicially. It should not be exercised capriciously (without reason) or on any wrong principle. It should be exercised for a substantial reason. The facts and circumstances on 28 April 2025 on which the ruling was made were as follows.
The postponement request on 28 April 2025 was a repeat of what happened on 3 February 2025. After what transpired in court on 3 February 2025, the respondents knew that a postponement could not simply be sought from the bar on the day of the hearing without prior notice and without a substantive application. Christian is not an ordinary lay litigant. He has been litigating in the court for many years, and he is familiar with the court’s processes.
Halweendo filed a notice of representation for the second respondent on 31 January 2025, but he was not available for the hearing on 3 February 2025. On 3 February 2025, the respondents sought a postponement from the bar without prior notice and without a substantive application, and Christian provided several dates Halweendo would be available, one of which was 18 February 2025. The case was postponed to 18 February 2025 as an absolute last postponement to obtain a new hearing date. The 3 February 2025 court order itself stated that. One of the issues raised by the applicants on 3 February 2025 was that there was no postponement application before court and that there were no facts properly placed before court. The court was also referred to its strict non-vacation policy on matters set down for hearing. The court explained to the respondents that there must be a written postponement application on prior notice, but after further submissions made by Christian, the court exercised its discretion in the respondents’ favour and granted their postponement request, thereby affording them an opportunity to have a legal practitioner present their case. The respondents did not tender the applicants’ wasted costs. Christian suggested the wasted costs must be costs in the cause. The applicants’ counsel submitted that the applicants’ prejudice is that attorney client costs may even be offered twice, but they will never be recovered. On 3 February 2025, the applicants were already concerned that if the case was postponed on that day, there was no guarantee that Halweendo would come to argue the case because to submit that someone else is willing to pay for their legal fees is not that someone has paid the funds into trust. It was further pointed out that despite the 19 June 2024 court order, the respondents went and offered the farm for sale to the first respondent, disregarding the rule of law. The applicants’ prejudice was also stated to be that the first respondent is not going to consider the first applicant’s offer until the period has been extended. The applicants’ counsel concluded that if a postponement is granted, when the matter returns to court, it should proceed with or without legal representation, as the applicants have an article 12 constitutional right to finalise the case as speedily as possible. The court made it clear to the respondents that the postponement will be the last, and for that reason, it was postponed to 18 February 2025, when Halweendo would be available, so that a mutually convenient new hearing date can be allocated.
Halweendo appeared in court on 18 February 2025 when the matter was set down and postponed to 28 April 2025 for hearing. On 18 February 2025, the applicants’ counsel placed on record that he had discussed with Halweendo whether he was placed in funds so that the hearing date would not come with a last-minute withdrawal because of no funds, and Halweendo informed him he was placed ‘half in funds’. Halweendo submitted that he wanted to deliver supplementary heads of argument and confirmed he was placed partially in funds. The court informed Halweendo that if the matter is set down, it will not be postponed again, albeit for funds, and if Halweendo accepts the brief, and on his appearance in court, a hearing date is accepted, he will argue it with or without funds. The matter was then set down and postponed to 28 April 2025 for hearing, and directions were given for delivering supplementary heads of argument.
On 28 April 2025, there was, as before, no postponement application on prior notice. The third respondent, who was in court on 3 February 2025, simply asked for another postponement from the bar, notwithstanding what happened in court on 3 February 2025 and what the court stated on that day, as detailed above. His request was based on Halweendo’s telephone call to him around 21h00 the previous day, with no explanation of what happened since 3 February 2025. On 28 April 2025, the matter was stood down for Halweendo to be called to court. The applicants’ legal practitioner managed to reach a lady who said she was Halweendo’s personal assistant, but Halweendo himself could not be reached. Not even by the third respondent, one of his clients. Halweendo also did not file supplementary heads of argument for the respondents, which was due on 9 April 2025.
The respondents’ explanation provided on 28 April 2025 was insufficient, unreasonable and unacceptable as to why another postponement was sought and why it was only sought on the day of the hearing without prior notice and without a substantive application. From 3 February 2025 to 28 April 2025, the respondents had almost three months to get their affairs in order for the hearing on 28 April 2025. The telephone call from Halweendo to the third respondent on 27 April 2025 is unacceptable to be proffered as the trigger for the required postponement. Surely Halweendo and the respondents had to prepare for the hearing before 27 April 2025, in that the respondent’s supplementary heads of argument was due on 9 April 2025.
The extension application was postponed once before. The respondents were already indulged once before. Given the facts and circumstances detailed above and what was put before court on 28 April 2025, albeit from the bar, there was no basis to again indulge them. The respondents were in court on 3 February 2025. They were aware of the basis on which the matter was postponed on 3 February 2025 and that the case will not be postponed again. Halweendo, who the respondents chose as their legal practitioner, was in court on 18 February 2025, and he was aware of the basis on which the matter was set down for hearing on 28 April 2025. Notwithstanding Halweendo’s deplorable conduct and disrespect shown towards the court by his failure to appear in court on 28 April 2025, the respondents are not blameless. They had a duty to ensure their house was in order for their opposition to be presented to court on 28 April 2025. In those circumstances, Halweendo’s conduct is visited on the respondents. From what was placed before court, it would appear they failed to place Halweendo in funds, thereby contributing to Halweendo not appearing in court on 28 April 2025 while aware that the matter would not be postponed again. It has been accepted by the court and the Supreme Court that there is a limit beyond which a litigant cannot escape the results of his legal practitioner’s conduct.
The court order to which the extension application related was dated 19 June 2024. More than ten months have passed since 19 June 2024, and the order could, to date, not be implemented because of the ten-day period contained in that court order. The extension application was launched in November 2024 already, and about five months have passed, but the application has not been heard. That was after the previous application for directions on extension, launched in June 2024, was struck out in September 2024. The applicants were prejudiced in that the 19 June 2024 court order could still not be implemented. The delay they have already endured cannot be compensated by an appropriate cost order. The main case has been finalised, and the applicants are entitled to have the court order implemented. The costs of the previous postponement on 3 February 2025 had already been stood over. Almost three months later, the applicants had no compensation for that postponement, and the position was about to be repeated. According to the applicants, their costs would, in any event, be irrecoverable.
The case is not one where justice justified another postponement. The previous postponement was for legal representation. The respondents were given an opportunity to obtain legal representation, but they did not use it because on 28 April 2025, they wanted another postponement for the same reason. The relief sought in the extension application will not adversely affect the respondents. The 19 June 2024 court order exists in fact and law and must be implemented. That court order did not impose any consequence if the ten-day period is not complied with. The fact that the first step was not implemented within the ten days does therefore not mean that it need not or may not be implemented. Given the provisions of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995, it must be implemented.
The respondents have been representing themselves in the main application with Christian’s assistance from inception. Christian was in court on 28 April 2025 for the second respondent, and the third, fourth and fifth respondents were also in court. The instant application is for an extension of time, which is not a complex matter in fact or law. Having represented themselves in the main application without wanting a legal practitioner, the respondents could also represent themselves on 28 April 2025.
In those circumstances, and based on those facts, the court refused the postponement request on 28 April 2025. On the case facts, granting another postponement would not be exercising the court’s discretion judicially. After the postponement request was refused, the respondents were informed that they may participate in the hearing and make submissions if they wanted to. Led by Christian, they all left the courtroom, while Christian said that they would appeal.
The court then proceeded to hear oral arguments from the applicants’ counsel on the extension application.
The court now considers the extension application.
None of the factual allegations relied on by the applicants for the extension application was disputed. Those factual allegations are accepted as set out above. The points in limine referred to in the replying affidavit do not arise from the answering affidavit and are thus not entertained.
In the respondents’ heads of argument, the following issues are raised.
A point in limine is raised about the court order dated 3 July 2024, whereby the court ordered the applicants to serve their 28 June 2024 application for directions on the respondents and postponed that application to 31 July 2024 to hear the parties on it. The respondents contend that application was not served on them, the 3 July 2024 court order was made without the court having jurisdiction over the respondents, they were deprived of their right to be heard, and that court order is null and void. It is correct that the 28 June 2024 application for directions was not served on the respondents, hence, on 3 July 2024, the court ordered the applicants to do so, whereafter that application was served on the respondents. The 3 July 2024 court order was given so that the applicants could be heard on that application. The non-service issue at the time was not jurisdictional. That argument by the respondents is misplaced. The 3 July 2024 court order was not sought to be set aside by the respondents, and, in law, it stands. Moreover, that application was ultimately struck with costs (limited to the respondents’ disbursements) and finalised on 24 September 2024 and is no longer before court. The respondents’ point in limine is irrelevant to the instant extension application and is dismissed.
The respondents revisit the merits of the main application. That is not allowed. The merits in the main application have been decided, and the court’s order and judgment thereon are final.
In the answering affidavit, the respondents rely on rules 54(1), 54(3) and 55. They read as follows:
‘54. (1) Where a party has failed to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order, any sanction for a failure to comply imposed by the rule, practice direction or court order has effect and consequences for such failure and such effect and consequences follow, unless the party in default applies for and is granted relaxation, extension of time or relief from sanction.’
‘(3) Where a party fails to deliver a pleading within the time stated in the case plan order or within any extended time allowed by the managing judge, that party is in default of filing such pleading and is by that very fact barred.’
‘55. (1) The court or the managing judge may, on application on notice to every party and on good cause shown, make an order extending or shortening a time prescribed by these rules or by an order of court for doing an act or taking a step in connection with proceedings of any nature whatsoever, on such terms as the court or managing judge considers suitable or appropriate.
(2) An extension of time may be ordered although the application is made before the expiry of the time prescribed or fixed and the managing judge ordering the extension may make any order he or she considers suitable or appropriate as to the recalling, varying or cancelling of the consequences of default, whether such consequences flow from the terms of any order or from these rules.’
Rule 54 deals with sanctions for non-compliance in the absence of a defaulting party obtaining relief, relaxation, extension or condonation. Under rule 54(1), any sanction for a failure to comply imposed by, in this case, a court order, has effect and consequences for such failure and such effect and consequences follow, unless the defaulter applies for and is granted relaxation, extension of time or relief from sanction. The 19 June 2024 court order did not impose any sanction for a failure to comply with it. As a result, the failure to comply with the ten days in that court order did not have any effect or consequence, and there was no duty on the applicants to apply for a relaxation, extension of time or relief from sanction under rule 54(1).
Rule 55 deals with upliftment of bar, extension of time, relaxation or condonation. Under rule 55(2), an extension of time may be ordered although the application is made before the expiry of the time prescribed or fixed and the managing judge ordering the extension may make any order considered suitable or appropriate as to recalling, varying or cancelling the consequences of the default whether they flow from the terms of any order or the rules. That simply means that such an application may be made before the time expires. It does not mean that such an application may not be made after the time has expired, as the respondents contend. Therefore, the respondents’ position that one can only request an extension of time before the time lapsed and the applicants failed to seek condonation for the late filing of the instant application is dismissed.
Under rule 54(3), a party who fails to deliver a pleading within the time stated in the case plan order or within any extended time allowed by the managing judge is in default of filing such pleading and is barred by that very fact. The 24 September 2024 court order, which directed the applicants to deliver their extension application on or before 29 October 2024, was not a case plan order. It was an order made on the hearing date of the initial application for directions for extension, following the striking of that application. Moreover, the institution of the instant application is not a pleading as envisaged in rule 54(3). As a result, rule 54(3) did not bar the applicants from launching the instant application. Therefore, the respondents’ position that the instant application is ipso facto barred and that the court is incompetent to grant an extension of time is dismissed.
That disposes of the bases on which the respondents opposed the instant application. The court now considers the applicants’ case.
In their heads of argument, the applicants argued that rules 18(2)(a) and 55(1) provide that the court may extend the time specified in an order for doing something. That argument was, correctly, not persisted during oral argument. Rule 18 deals with the court’s power to manage cases. The main case was finalised on 19 June 2024, and nothing remains to be managed. As a result, rule 18(2)(a) does not apply to the instant application.
That leaves rule 55(1). Under that rule, ‘the court’ or ‘the managing judge’ may on application on notice to every party and on good cause shown, make an order ‘extending’ or shortening a time prescribed by, in this case, ‘an order of court’ for ‘doing an act or taking a step in connection with proceedings of any nature whatsoever’ on such terms as ‘the court’ or ‘the managing judge’ considers suitable or appropriate.
Rule 55(1) is not limited to a matter that is being case managed. It refers to ‘the court’ or ‘the managing judge’. Rule 55(1) relates to the doing of an act or taking a step in connection with any proceedings of any nature whatsoever. The word ‘proceedings’ is not defined in the rules. In law, proceedings refer to actions taken in court or in court proceedings. The proceedings in the case at hand were finalised on 19 June 2024, and there are no pending proceedings in that case, but the 19 June 2024 court order related to such proceedings. Moreover, as submitted by the applicants’ counsel on the court’s enquiry about the ‘proceedings’, ‘proceedings’ should include ‘execution proceedings’, which the instant application is directed at in that it concerns the implementation of the 19 June 2024 court order. The court concludes that rule 55(1) applies to that court order, and an extension of time may be applied for on good cause shown under rule 55(1).
It has been held time and again that the extent of ‘good cause’ is not defined. Considering the nature of the instant application ‘good cause’ cannot be interpreted to have its ordinary meaning in condonation applications that a party is required to give a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the default and show that it has prospects of success in the main case. The main case is finalised and there are no prospects of success to be shown therein. As submitted by the applicants’ counsel on the court’s enquiry about what good cause would entail in the instant application, prospects of success are required in condonation applications because if there are none, it would be pointless to grant condonation. What then remains is that there must be a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the default.
When the relief was sought in the main case, the applicants’ position was that the order sought could have been complied with within ten days. Due to circumstances beyond their control, that position changed with the new requirements imposed since 2022, of which the applicants were unaware when the relief was sought in the main case. New facts arose after the 19 June 2024 court order was made. The initial application for directions was brought on 1 July 2024, before the ten-day period expired. That application was struck out and followed by the instant application. In those circumstances, it cannot be said that the applicants delayed in bringing the instant application. On the case facts, the farm was offered for sale to the first respondent as soon as was reasonably possible.
The court finds the applicants provided a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the default, and the application should succeed by granting an extension of the ten-day period in paragraph 1 of the 19 June 2024 court order to 25 October 2024, being a date as soon as was reasonably possible.
If the court is wrong in that rule 55(1) does not cloth it with power to grant an extension of time, the court’s inherent jurisdiction would give it such power. If not, the court would be powerless to give effect to its own order.
On that note, the applicants argued that the grant of an extension of time is within the court’s jurisdiction. The applicants relied on the following stated by Jerold Taits in The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The court’s inherent jurisdiction is those unwritten powers, ancillary to its common law and statutory powers, without which it would be unable to act in accordance with justice and good reason. It has been defined in Montreal Trust Co v Churchill Forrest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd as:
‘. . . the reserve fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them.’
Granting an extension of time would give effect to the 19 June 2024 court order. If not under rule 55(1), the court exercises its inherent jurisdiction to grant the extension of time.
Paragraph 2 of the 19 June 2024 court order provides that the first respondent may exercise the State’s preferent right within 60 days of receiving the offer from the first respondent. The offer was submitted on 25 October 2024, and 60 days had passed while the first respondent had not processed the application because of the ten-day period in the 19 June 2024 court order. To give effect to that court order, the court considers it suitable, appropriate, just and equitable also to extend the 60 days in paragraph 2 of that court order. The court does that under rule 55(1), alternatively, in exercising its inherent jurisdiction. Extending the 60 days in paragraph 2 of the 19 June 2024 court order was canvassed at the hearing on 28 April 2024 and falls under further relief in paragraph 3 of the notice of motion. In fairness to the first respondent, the 60-day period in paragraph 2 of the 19 June 2024 court order, is extended to 60 days from the date of service of this order on the first respondent by the deputy sheriff under rule 8.
For their prayer that the respondents pay the costs on an attorney and own client cost scale, the applicants rely on the following facts. The previous offer of the farm to the first respondent was made on 28 July 2022. Since then, the respondents had access to the farm, removed items and structures, and prohibited the first respondent’s agents from accessing the farm. Those allegations were not denied by the respondents. The applicants’ counsel argued that removing items and structures from the farm is common law theft. He further argued that by prohibiting access to the farm, the court order cannot be implemented, and as such, they obstructed its implementation. Lastly, the applicants rely on Geiseb offering the farm for sale to the first respondent on 8 August 2024 on behalf of the respondents, while the farm no longer belongs to them.
The applicants failed to state when the respondents removed items and structures from the farm. The date may be important to determine whether that fact should be considered for a punitive cost order in the instant application. Without a date, the court is slow to say that because of that fact, there should be a punitive cost order. Moreover, the instant application was not necessitated by that fact. The fact that the respondents prohibited the applicants’ agent from accessing the farm was also not why the ten-day period could not have been complied with. The instant application was necessitated due to the ministerial requirements having changed since 2022. Hence, the respondents’ obstructive conduct did not necessitate the instant application. Although the respondents’ offer of the farm for sale to the first respondent on 8 August 2024 is deplorable, that too did not necessitate the instant application. Since none of the facts relied on for the punitive cost order moved the applicants to institute the instant application and, in the applicants’ own submission, it was not strictly necessary to bring the application, the court declines a punitive cost order against the respondents.
The general rule on costs is that costs follow the event. One of the exceptions to the general cost rule is that where an indulgence is sought, costs do not follow the event, and the party seeking the indulgence should pay the application’s costs. Such a party may even be ordered to pay the costs of opposition. If the instant application is categorised as indulgence-seeking, the applicants are responsible for its costs. However, given the reason why the instant application had to be brought, it becomes questionable whether it falls within the category seeking an indulgence. Even if it does not fall into that category, the applicants should have put more thought into the relief sought in the main application and foreseen the possibility that the ten-day period may be insufficient. In those circumstances, the applicants should be responsible for the costs occasioned in bringing the application. The further question is whether the applicants should also be responsible for the costs of opposition.
The applicants did not seek costs from the respondents upfront. The applicants only sought costs from them in case they opposed the application. The respondents decided to oppose the application. Their opposition was unreasonable and unsuccessful. Their opposition unjustifiably increased the application’s costs. In those circumstances, the respondents should pay the applicants’ costs occasioned by their opposition.
Rule 32(11) was not addressed by any of the parties. That rule relates to ‘any interlocutory proceeding’. As stated above, the main application is finalised. The instant application came before court post-judgment on the merits. As such, it is not an interlocutory proceeding and rule 32(11) does not apply.
In conclusion, it is ordered that:
The period of ten days from 19 June 2024 in paragraph 1 of the court order dated 19 June 2024 under HC-MD-CIV-MOT-GEN-2023/00243 attached hereto marked ‘A’ is extended to 25 October 2024.
The period of 60 days of receiving the offer from the first applicant in paragraph 2 of the court order dated 19 June 2024 under HC-MD-CIV-MOT-GEN-2023/00243 attached hereto marked ‘A’ is extended to 60 days from the date of service of this order on the first respondent by the deputy sheriff under rule 8.
Subject to paragraph 4 below, the applicants must bear the costs of bringing the application under INT-HC-VARJDGORD-2024/00950.
The second to the fifth respondents must pay the applicants’ costs occasioned by their opposition to the application under INT-HC-VARJDGORD-2024/00950 jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved on a party and party cost scale.
The status hearing scheduled for 21 May 2025 under HC-MD-CIV-MOT-GEN-2023/00243 is cancelled.
The matters under INT-HC-VARJDGORD-2024/00950 and HC-MD-CIV-MOT-GEN-2023/00243 are finalised and removed from the roll. |
