Powell and Another v Insolvent Estate D. Lidchi (APPEAL 368 of 1997) [1998] NAHC 2 (18 February 1998)

POWELL. OLIVER. N.O. & 1 OTHER VERSUS INSOLVENT ESTATE D. LIDCHT

STRYDOM, J.P.

INSOLVENCY:

Vesting of movable property in trust1;uch property outside jurisdiction of Court where person declared insolvent - necessity to show that Court granting order of insolvency was Court of insolvent's domicile -Domicile - what factors Court should consider to determine domicile.

CASE NO. A.368/97

1998/02/18

4.1' Declaring that all movable property, including the shares registered in the name of Diane Lidchi in the share registers of Offshore Diamonds (SWA) Limited ("Offshore Diamonds"), Diamond Dredging and Mining CO. (SWA) Limited ("Diamond Dredging"), Moly Copper Mining and Exploration Company (SWA) Limited ("Moly Copper") and Lorelei Copper Mines Limited ("Lorelei") vest in the Applicants in their capacity aforesaid;

4.2 Declaring that the immovable property situate at Erf 266

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and Erf 267, Luderitz vests in the Applicants and in their capacity aforesaid;

4. Declaring that the purported resolutions of the boards of directors of Offshore Diamonds, Diamond Dredging, Moly Copper and Lorelei amexed to the founding affidavit as Annexures "OMP.14A" to "OMP.14D" are invalid and null and void and of no force or effect;

5. Declaring that the costs of this application be costs in the administration in the insolvent estate of the Insolvent, save in the event of any party opposing this application in which event that this Honourable Court make such order in regard to the costs as it deems meet.

5. That an interim interdict is hereby granted pending the final
determination of this application that the Insolvent, Clara
Kahan, and the Clamodianel Trust are interdicted and restrained
from in any way whatever^

6. directly or indirectly dealing in any manner with, alienating, or disposing of, encumbering or exercising any right whatever attaching to the shares in Offshore Diamonds, Diamond Dredging, Moly Copper and Lorelei, registered in the name of the Insolvent;

7. alienating, disposing or encumbering or otherwise dealing with the immovable property situated at Erf 266 and 267, Luderitz;

8. from in any way whatever implementing or giving affect to any of the resolutions more fully referred to in prayer 4.3 above.

6. That the costs of this application be reserved for determination
on the return date of the said Rule Nisi.

7. That service of the Rule Nisi, and the Notice of Motion herein and the founding affidavit herein together with all annexures thereto be served on:

9. the Insolvent at 2 Upper Park Drive, Forest Town, Johannesburg; _f

10. Clara Kahan at 2 Upper Park Drive, Forest Town, Johannesburg;

11. Mr Farrel Wainer at c/o Fisher Hoffman Sithole, FHS i

House, 5 Girton Road, Parktown, Johannesburg.

12. Offshore Diamonds at N.G. Church Centre, Windhoek Namibia;

13. Diamond Dredging at N.G. Church Centre, Windhoek, Namibia;

14. Moly Copper at N.G. Church Centre, Windhoek, Namibia;

15. Lorelei at N.G. Church Centre, Windhoek Namibia.

"

OMP.14D.

M

The more important of these resolutions are -

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That Clara Kahan is authorized to act as Chairman of the group and to

pursue or enter into litigation;

2.

To authorize Clara Kahan to investigate the books of account and

records of subsidiaries, and to employ the services of forensic

accountants;

To authorize the representatives of the company on the board of the

property companies, who are subsidiaries of Moly Copper, to take steps

to ensure that a resolution is passed to arrange for the immovable properties to be realized and to take the necessary steps to advertise the properties for sale.

16. To provide that without the written approval of Clara Kahan, or her alternate, no new signatories be permitted to operate any of the bank accounts of the companies; and

17. That all money of any of the subsidiaries of the companies be paid into authorized bank accounts and that no money be withheld from being so deposited.

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It was pointed out by the Applicants that Clara Kahan was a woman of 87 years with frail health and it was alleged that she was only set up to do the Respondent's bidding. The Applicants further stated that because of their entitlement to the shares vesting in the Respondent, any action precipitously taken at the instance of the Respondent, could diminish the value of their shareholding. The Applicants pointed out, that according to Kahan, the value of the properties runs into several million rand.

The Respondent in turn pointed out that Kahan and his son exercised unilateral control over certain of the companies and have availed themselves frequently of funds and overdraft facilities regarding these companies. As far as the joint shareholders agreement was concerned the Respondent stated that it was no longer in existence. The Respondent also referred to other alleged irregularities committed by Kahan and

further stated that the authority given to Clara Kahan was taken at properly constituted meetings of boards of directors operating in terms of the articles and memoranda of each of the companies.

The Respondent therefore did not dispute that the resolutions were taken and that they were so taken at board meetings of which the Kahan group had no notice and were not present. The attitude of the Respondent was that she was no longer bound by the joint shareholders agreement and that the resolutions were validly taken according to the articles and memoranda of the respective companies. It was further also denied by the Respondent that the Applicants had made out any basis on which to attack the resolutions.

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In her answering affidavit the Respondent further set out various grounds on which she alleged maladministration of her estate by the Applicants and it was further alleged that the Applicants identified themselves with Kahan notwithstanding a clear conflict between their interests as co-trustees in the estate and the interests of Kahan. The Respondent further intimated that she intended to bring an application for the removal of the Applicants as co-trustees in her estate.

2. POINTS IN LIMINE

In his heads of argument, and whilst addressing the Court, Mr Bregman raised certain points in limine which, if successful, may lead to the dismissal of the application or a postponement thereof in order to give possible interested parties an opportunity to be joined in the application. It will be convenient to deal with those points at the outset.

2.1. THE APPLICATION BROUGHT WAS MISCONCEIVED

Mr. Bregman submitted that there was no necessity for the Applicants to have brought the application. His argument was that the Applicants, being provisional co-trustees in the insolvent estate, brought the application on the basis that the Respondent was domiciled in South Africa. In that event they would nomine officii take control of all movable assets of the Respondent that

there may be. All the shares are movable assets which would thus come under

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the control of the Applicants. This would have entitled the Applicants to sit on shareholders and other meetings of the companies. Together with Kahan they could therefore control the companies and thereby undo all those resolutions which they are now complaining about.

However the Respondent vigorously opposed the application by the Applicants. This she did in an affidavit which, together with documents attached, comprised some 300 pages. In this affidavit her main defence was that, at the time that she was sequestrated in South Africa, that country was not her country of domicile. Respondent further alleged that all the movable property in Namibia, namely her shares to which the Applicants lay claim, did not belong to her but was in fact the property of her mother Clara Kahan, and that she was therefore only holding these shares in name.

In my opinion, and that was also the attitude of both Counsel, these defences go to the root of the Applicant's claims and if either should succeed it would be the end of the Application. Both these defences were foreshadowed by the Applicants in their founding affidavit. And, as previously pointed out, these defences were not only raised by the Respondent but was pursued with vigour and energy. The Applicants, aware of Jhe contentions of the Respondent regarding her domicile and that she was holding the shares only as a nominee for Clara Kahan, were, as was submitted by Mr. Rubens, entitled, and in my opinion compelled to approach this Court for a declaratory order. That is precisely what they did and I therefor do not agree with Mr Bregman's submission that the Application was misconceived. In any event although it is strictly not necessary for trustees, laying claim to movable assets in a Country other than the Country of the insolvent's domicile where the sequestration was obtained, for recognition, Berman, J, pointed out that such an application is invariably made and the need for formal recognition has now been elevated into a principle. See Ex Parte Palmer N.O: In re Hahn. 1993 (3) SA 359 (CPD) at 362 E.

2.2 JOINDER

Mr. Bregman furthermore submitted that the Court should dismiss the Application on the basis that the four companies, Offshore Diamonds, Diamond Dredging, Moly Copper and Lorelei were interested parties in these proceedings but that the Applicants have failed to join them. The main thrust of Mr. Bregman's argument was that the Court is, inter alia, asked to interdict these companies from carrying out certain resolutions and, unless they were joined as parties, any order of this Court in this regard would not be effective and would not bind these companies. It was however conceded by Mr. Bregman that the companies were aware of the proceedings and so were the Lidchi and Kahan groups. Counsel submitted however that this was not enough.

Mr. Rubens, on the other hand, pointed out that the Notice of Motion and

supporting documents as well as the Order of Court were all, in terms of the

Order, served on the companies. Furthermore that all the interested parties 1

made affidavits one way or the other and that the Respondent stated in her answering affidavit that she opposed the relief sought in her personal capacity as well as in her capacity as a director and shareholder of the affected companies. In this regard Mr. Rubens referred the Court to the case of Wholesale Provision Supplies CC v Exim International CC and Another, 1995 (1) SA 150 (T.P.D.).

It is undoubtedly so that parties who have a real and substantial interest in relief asked should be before the Court and that the Court could mero motu take such point even though the parties themselves did not take it (See Amalgated Engineering Union vs Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A)) Mahomed, J (as he then was) pointed out in the Wholesale Provision Supplies -case, supra, at p 158 D-G, that this rule was not absolute and that a Court must have regard also to the circumstances of a particular case. After reviewing a number of cases the learned Judge stated as follows:

"These observations clearly show, in my view, that the rule which seeks to avoid orders which might affect third parties in proceedings between other parties is hot simply a mechanical or technical rule which must ritualistically be applied, regardless of the circumstances of the case. For this reason the Court in Smith v Conelect 1987 (3) SA 689 (W) held that, where the third party has waived his right to be joined, the failure to join him as a third party was no bar when ordering the

proceedings which might affect him, because he was not prejudiced in

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these circumstances."

In the present case the document initiating the process were served on the companies. The companies act through their directors. All those directors representing the Lidchi group deposed to affidavits in support of the Respondent, Mrs. Lidchi. The Kahan group, as represented by Kahan and his son Phillip, made affidavits in support of the Applicants. The Respondent clearly states in her answering affidavit that she also represents the affected companies as director and she amply and vigorously put their interests and _ views before the Court. As was submitted by Mr. Rubens there is nothing more that can be placed before the Court. There is in my opinion also no suggestion in the documents filed before the Court to suggest that the various companies had an interest adverse to the interests of the Respondent. (See the

Amalgated Engineering Union-case, supra, p.649).

As was stated by the learned Judge in the Wholesale Provision Suplies-case, supra, at 1581, to deny the applicants relief under these circumstances if they are entitled to it just because the companies were not formally joined as a party would be without justification in law and would in no way advance the interests of justice.

2.3 EX PARTE APPLICATION

In separate heads of argument Mr. Bregman, without arguing it, submitted that

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the Court should dismiss the Application because it was brought ex parte and without notice to the Respondent. Counsel submitted that in those circumstances there was a duty on the Applicants to act bona fide and to place all relevant facts before the Court. (See Schlesinger v Schlesinger 1979 (4) SA 342 (W) at 353 C-D and Hall and Another v Hevns and Others, 1991 (1) SA 381 (C) at 397C).

Various grouds were mentioned in the heads such as that the Applicants failed to inform the Court of the prospects of success of the various pending applications for appeal launched by the Respondent; the shareholding disputes; the prejudice to the companies if the resolutions taken are not being give effect to; the relationship between Kahan and Applicants and their common attorney and their possible removal as provisional trustees as a result thereof; their maladministration of the estate and intended removal as a result thereof etc.

With due respect to Counsel I do not think that there is any substance in these submissions. The applicants properly placed all relevant material facts before the Court. They informed the Court of what orders or judgments applications of appeal were launched. As provisional trustees their duty was to secure and protect the interest of creditors and this was the purpose of this application. They informed the Court of the disputes regarding the companies' shares. After all that was the reason for the application. That the Applicants are in cahoots with Kahan or his attorney, or that they did not properly administer the

estate, were denied by them.

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Of more substance are Counsel's submissions concerning the fact that the ex parte order, obtained before Teek, J, contains in two respects final orders to which the Respondent had no opportunity to be heard. This is the issue of urgency and the recognition of the Applicants as provisional trustees in the estate. Regarding the first point Mr. Bregman stated that the application was only launched months after the resolutions complained of were already taken and minuted. In this regard it was explained by the Applicants that the Kahan group had no notice of these board meetings. When Kahan became aware thereof he immediately informed the Applicants whereupon these proceedings were prepared and launched. I have previously set out the nature of the resolutions taken. That these resolutions were taken is common cause, and also that no notice was given to the Kahan group. As will become apparent later

I am of the opinion that the Applicants had good reason to suspect that these resolutions were calculated to, and enabled the Respondent to affect the interests of creditors of the Respondent's estate adversely. In my opinion the matter was urgent and Applicants were entitled to approach the Court on that basis.

In regard to the second point I have already referred to the fact that strictly speaking it was not necessary for the Applicants to ask the Court for recognition in order to be vested with the movable assets of the Respondent. This happened by operation of law. (See Bekker NO v Kotze and Others,

1996 (4) SA 1293 (NmHC) at 1295 I - 1296 C). As the Applicants do not ask

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the Court to be also vested with any immovable property of the Respondent such recognition was, as regards the present application, not of great significance. More so also if this Court should decide that the Respondent was not domiciled in the Republic of S.A. at the time of the sequestration, such recognition will be a brutum fulmen.

THE MERITS OF THE APPLICATION

3.1 THE LAW

The parties seem to me to be ad idem in regard to the law applicable to an application of this nature. It was accepted that at common law a sequestration order granted by the Court of the debtors domicile ipso facto divests an insolvent of his movable property wherever situated. However a sequestration order granted by any other Court has per se no effect on a debtor's assets, whether movable or immovable, situated outside jurisdiction of that Court. (See Mars: The Law of Insolvency 8th ed at p. 177; Viljoen v. Venter NO 1981 (2) SA 152 (w) and the Bekker-case, supra,).

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From this it follows therefore that if the Respondent was domiciled in South Africa where the sequestration order was granted all movable property of the Respondent situated in Namibia would vest in the Applicants.

3.2 DOMICILE OF THE RESPONDENT

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The question of where the Respondent was domiciled at the time of the sequestration goes to the heart of the Application. The Respondent alleged in her answering affidavit that she was at the time, and still is, domiciled in Namibia. To substantiate this claim the Court was referred to the fact that she was born in Namibia and obtained citizenship of this Country soon after it became independent. Furthermore that she has immovable assets in Namibia and that her business, regarding various companies, are in Namibia. The Respondent also renders tax returns and pays tax in Namibia. It was further pointed out that when in Namibia the Respondent stayed in a hotel and when in Johannesburg she stays at the house at 2 Upper Park Drive, Forest Town. Shortly before the application for sequestration was launched the house in which the Respondent resided was transferred to her daughter, according to

Respondent, pursuant to an agreement of sale which was entered into in 1992.

The Applicants alleged that according to Kahan the Respondent was born in Namibia on 8 February, 1931. Some two years later the family moved to South Africa where they first settled in Port Elizabeth and then, since 1936, in Johannesburg where Respondent still resides to date hereof. In certain affidavits in proceedings between Kahan and the Respondent, she stated that she resides in Namibia or gave a Namibian address. This address was however always that of van Schalkwyk's office. According to Respondent she always resided at the Furstenhof Hotel when she was in Namibia and where she was always addressed on her arrival with the words "Welcome home Mrs. Lidchi." The Respondent also stated inter alia "That Namibia is my place of domicile and it is where I regard my permanent home to be."

It was first of all submitted by Mr. Bregman that there was a clear dispute of fact between the parties and that for that reason alone the matter cannot be resolved by the Court on affidavit. Further referring to the abovementioned factors Counsel submitted that it was clearly demonstrated that the "centre of gravity" of the Respondent was in Namibia. It was submitted that a distinction should be drawn between residence and domicile. A person can be resident in a country despite a tempory absence and may have two or more residences. Residence can mean more and less than domicile and Counsel referred the Court to Zwvssig v Zwyssig, 1997 (2) SA 467 at 470. The Court was also referred to Pollak: 2nd Ed p 42/43 and Lawsa, first reissue, Vol. 2 p 320 pa

Mr. Rubens denied the proposition that in general a person would have no place of residence in a country and still be domiciled there. With reference to Pollak, op. cit, Mr. Rubens submitted that when a person is domiciled in a State he usually also has his home there., Pollak, p 43, states that it is well possible for a person to be domiciled in a state without having a home there but further states that that is an unusual case. Mr. Rubens also referred the Court to Forsythe : 2nd Ed.: Private International Law, pill.

I cannot agree with Mr. Bregman that there is a clear dispute made out on the papers or that it is uncertain whether viva voce evidence might not disturb the balance of probabilities wherever they may lie in terms of the documents. (See Trustbank van Afrika v Western Bank en Andere. 1978 (4) S.A. 281 at 299 H).

The approach of a Court to this question seems to have been set out by Voet Commentaruis 5:1:98 where the following is stated:

"Whether a place or country is a man's home, is a question of fact.

Whether a place or country is a man's domicile, is a question of mixed

fact and law, or rather, of the inference drawn by law from certain facts

, "quoted in Lawsa, op cit, p 332 footnote 2.

There would in my opinion have been a dispute of fact if one or other of the facts mentioned before, and from which the Court is asked to draw its inference, were denied, but that is not the case. There is no dispute between the parties as to what facts the Court should consider in coming to its conclusion. What is vehemently disputed is the inference which the Court is asked to draw from those facts. I cannot see that evidence one way or the other could add or subtract from the factual allegations made in the affidavits, and which is in any event not in dispute. If I am wrong in this regard then, from what follows, it is in any event clear that I am of the opinion that such dispute is not genuine and that the probabilities overwhelmingly support the contention of the Applicants.

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In my opinion it is clear that generally speaking domicile and the place of a person's residence are closely connected. There are of course exceptions. See in this regard Lawsa, op cit, p 321, Forsythe op. cit, p 111, Pollak, op cit p 42, 43.

Whether residence is accompanied by the necessary animus manendi is to be inferred from the facts. Further it must be accepted that it is always free to the propositus to choose his domiciluim.

Looking at the facts placed before the Court it seems to me that only one of the facts mentioned by Mr. Bregman, from which the Court is asked to draw its inference in favour of the Respondent, existed as an act of volition, if I may put it so, by the Respondent. That is the fact that she took up Namibian citizenship which' she was entitled to do as she was born in Namibia. The immovable property that she owned in Namibia she inherited. Those are in any event vacant plots situated in Luderitz. What interest the Respondent may have in the companies presently registered in Namibia, she also inherited or, on her version, she is only holding the shares in those companies as a nominee for her mother, Clara Kahan. As these companies are Namibian based and may be a source of income, tax returns and the payment of tax must be rendered and paid to Namibia. In this regard the Court was not informed whether she also pays tax to the Government of South Africa or not.

There is further the repeated claims by the Respondent that she always regarded Namibia as her permanent residence. Although a factor to be considered the fact remains that the Respondent is now resident in South Africa, and more particularly Johannesburg, for the past 60 years, where she also had her residence, at least up to 1992. Coupled with this is the fact that there is no place in Namibia which the Respondent can call home or where she resides. The fact that she in this regard had invariably made use of van Schalkwyk's office address demonstrates and underscores the fact that she is not resident here and has no residence in Namibia. It also belies the Respondent's claim that the Furstenhof hotel is her home in Namibia. There is no indication on the papers that the Respondent stayed in Namibia for any protracted time and the Furstenhof was in my opinion merely the place where she stayed when she was in Namibia for business purposes.

In the present instance it serves Respondent's interest to claim that she is indeed domiciled in Namibia. As was stated by Jansen, J (as he then was), in the case of Masey v Masev 1968 (2) SA 199 (T) at 200H:

"(T) he ipse dixit of an interested party in these circumstances should

be carefully scrutinized."

In the light of what I have set out herein before the say so of the Respondent that she always regarded Namibia as her permanent home seems to me to be no more than a selfserving statement which is raised at this stage to safeguard her Namibian interests against vesting in the Applicants.

In my opinion the only reasonable inference that the Court can draw from the facts is that the Respondent was indeed domiciled in South Africa at the time of her sequestration. From this it follows that any movable property which the Respondent has in Namibia vests in the Applicants by virtue of her sequestration.

3.3 OWNERSHIP OF THE SHARES:

In this regard it was alleged by the Respondent that all the shares registered in her name are almost entirely held as nominee for her mother. As previously stated there is no dispute between the parties in regard to the effect of a sequestration order on the movable property of the insolvent where such sequestration order was granted by the Court of domicile of the insolvent.

Similarly there is also no dispute between the parties that shares constitute movable property within the meaning of the definition of movable property contained in section 2 of the Insolvency Act, Act 24 of 1936. See also Standard Bank of South Africa Limited and Another v Ocean Commodities Inc. and Others. 1983 (1) SA 276 (A) at 288 and Two Sixty Four Investments (Try) Ltd v Trust Bani 1993 (3) S.A. 384 (WLD). It was further in my opinion also not disputed that such shares, if they were the property of the Respondent, entitled the Applicants to obtain registration thereof nomine officii in the register of members of the company as a result of which the Applicants, in their aforesaid capacity, will be deemed to be members of the said companies according to the provisions of sec. 103(3) of the Companies Act, Act No. 61 of 1973. Furthermore that no instrument of transfer is required to effect such registration. See sec. 133(2) of Act 61 of 1973.

Mr Bregman submitted to the Court that if the issue of domicile is decided in favour of the Applicants it would follow that all the shares registered in the Respondent's name would vest by operation of law in the Applicants which, as I understood Counsel, will make it unnecessary at this stage to decide whether the Respondent was the owner of such shares or whether she only held them as a nominee for Clara Kahan. It would then be for Clara Kahan to take out proceedings in the form of an interpleader, if she is so advised, to enforce her claim to the shares. I am sure that technically speaking Mr Bregman is correct and it is certainly a tempting thought to leave the matter there and not to deal further with it in this judgment. However to subject parties to further possible litigation when both sides have put all the material relevant to the issue before the Court and where both, at least on the documents before the Court, have asked that the matter be determined, it would, in my opinion, not be in the interests of Justice to leave this issue, hanging in the air. I am therefore of the opinion that I should deal with the issue of the ownership of those shares which are still in dispute. Jn this regard the Applicants have conceded that the Respondent did hold some shares in some of the companies as nominee for Clara Kahan. I will deal with that aspect more fully at a later stage.

Mr Rubens pointed out that there is no dispute between the parties about the 1

number of shares that are registered in the name of the Respondent and that the real issue is whether she is the owner of those shares, excluding the concessions made by the Applicants in their reply, or only the nominee. As pointed out by Counsel this claim, namely that she is only a nominee, is based on various grounds. In summary these grounds are as follows:

That Clara Kahan supported her husband and children whilst her husband was prospecting in Namibia. On his death in 1964 she was owed some R70,000 by his Estate. She was also owed payment for certain shares in terms of a divorce settlement between her and her husband in January, 1954. The transaction in regard to the shares referred to above, arose as follows. In terms of the divorce settlement it was recorded that Clara Kahan's late husband had sold 410 000 shares he held in a company Diamond Mining & Utility Company (SWA) Ltd and 20 000 shares he held in Industrial Diamonds South Africa (1945) Limited for certain amounts to Saddle Hill Diamonds (Pty) Ltd. The right to receive payment for these shares was ceded by her late husband to her in terms of the divorce settlement. It is then alleged by Respondent that Saddle Hill transferred the said shares to Offshore Diamonds without, according to Respondent, paying Clara Kahan what was owed to her or without first obtaining her consent for such a transaction.

In regard to 6666 shares in Moly Copper and 1800 shares in Diamond Dredging registered in the names of Respondent and Kahan, Respondent alleged that due to payments and oral bequests made by the three of them, namely Kahan, Clara Kahan and herself, these shares belong to Clara Kahan.

It was further alleged that over and above her legal right thereto Clara Kahan also has a moral right to these shares.

From the documentation put before the Court it seems that the source of the ownership in the shares is the will of the late husband of Clara Kahan who bequeathed these shares in the various companies to his two children, the Respondent and Kahan. At least as a starting point it seems to me that the Respondent was the owner of those shares which she inherited from her father.

Thereafter by some operation of law, rather than by any agreement or any other voluntary action by the parties, Clara Kahan became the owner of the shares, that, so I understood it, both the shares belonging to Respondent as well as Kahan. If this is not so then there is no logical explanation or reason why such a fate would only have befallen the shares inherited by Respondent and not also those of Kahan. It then further^seems strange that through all the years of struggle and deadlock Clara Kahan never stepped in and claimed what was rightfully hers. Such a conclusion as was contended for by the Respondent gives rise to some strange anomalies. One need only look at the way both Respondent and Kahan dealt with and controlled the various

companies. In this regard it is significant to note that Clara Kahan was not

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even a party to the shareholders or joint resolution agreement which governed the basis on which resolutions etc. were to be taken in regard to the companies. This agreement inter alia also deals with such topics as shareholding and the loss thereof in the affected companies and the resultant effect thereof on the Lidchi and Kahan groups. How this could be, when the majority of the shares were Clara Kahan's shares, is not clear.

I further agree with Mr Rubens that it is difficult if not impossible to extract any legal principle from the allegations made by Respondent as a result of which it can be concluded that the said shares, at some stage, became the property of Clara Kahan.

In regard to the claim of R70,000 which Clara Kahan had against her late husband's estate the Courts attention was drawn to the fact that a claim was submitted in that regard which was reflected in the liquidation and distribution account filed in the estate and which was signed by Respondent and Kahan as joint executors thereof

Dealing with the transfer of shares from Saddle Hill to Offshore Diamonds the Respondent alleged that without payment to Clara Kahan, or her consent, these shares could not be transferred. There is no allegations that these shares were the only assets of Saddle Hill. How Clara Kahan then became the owner of the shares is set out as follows by the Respondent namely:

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"Since Kahan and I were the registered shareholders and vendors of Offshore Diamonds shares, as nominees for our father to the extent of half of the issued shares in Offshore Diamonds, we were legally responsible to her for that default. I refer to the two letters annexed hereto, signed by myself and Kahan, marked "PI" and "P2" respectively."

How the sale of the shares by Saddle Hill to Offshore Diamonds could create this legal obligation is not clear to me. The obligation to pay Clara Kahan in terms of the divorce settlement and the cession rested on Saddle Hill and they remained so obligated in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. Annexures "PI" and "P2" do also not take the matter any further. These documents, signed by Respondent and Kahan, authorised Offshore Diamonds to allot 1 250 000 fully paid up shares to Mr. E Kahan, the father of Respondent and Kahan.

On this uncertain and unclear premis Respondent alleged that Clara Kahan then permitted herself and Kahan to act as her nominees. As was pointed out by Mr Rubens, Clara Kahan had at best a claim against her husband's deceased for the R70,000-00. And as previously set out this was in fact claimed from the estate. In regard to the shares of Offshore Diamonds no legal basis was in my opinion alleged why Clara Kahan would become the owner thereof just because of the transfer of shares from Saddle Hill to Offshore Diamonds. It is also not clear to me why such action by Saddle Hill would discharge the latter from its obligation to pay Clara Kahan.

Mr. Bregman submitted that the Court, considering what was in fact the administration of assets amongst members of a family operating at that stage in reasonable harmony, should not approach the issue too technically. Mr. Bregman further explained that the transfer of the shares by Saddle Hill divested Clara Kahan of her source of payment as set out in the divorce settlement agreement and this could therefore not have been done without her consent. I fail to see the logic of this argument. In terms of the cession Clara Kahan was entitled to payment by Saddle Hill and nothing more. There is no allegation that the shares transferred to Offshore Diamonds were the only or all the assets of Saddle Hill and even if that were so I fail to see how that would have entitled Clara Kahan to the shares of Offshore Diamonds.

Mr. Bregman submitted that although some of the allegations could have been

stated more fully the possibility of an arrangement between Respondent, Clara

Kahan and Kahan is not so farfetched that it cannot be said that viva voce

evidence could not disturb the balance of convenience as it exists on the

papers. I have already referred to some of the anomalies to which the

allegations of the Respondent will lead to., It was further pointed out by Mr.

Rubens that Respondent had made statements under oath and in correspondence

which were entirely inconsistent with her allegation that she only held the

various shares as nominee for Clara Kahan. This concerns also the so called

oral bequests of shares. All documentation seems to me to refute this claim

by the Respondent. See e.g. annexures "OMPR 28" and "OMPR 29". In my

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opinion viva voce evidence, far from disturbing the balance, can only further strengthens Applicant's case.

It was conceded by the Applicants that 1200 shares in Diamond Dredging and 125000 shares in Offshore Diamonds are held by the Respondent as nominee of Clara Kahan and the Applicants do not claim that those shares should vest in them.

3.4 THE COMPANY RESOLUTIONS

These resolutions all affect the companies relevant to these proceedings namely Offshore Diamonds, Diamond Dredging, Moly Copper and Lorelei. The minutes reflect that these resolutions were taken on the 22 June, 1997, i.e. at a time after the estate of the Respondent was already finally sequestrated in South Africa. It is common cause that these resolutions were taken without notice to or participation by any of the directors of the Kahan group.

Mr Rubens attacked the validity of the resolutions on two grounds namely:

18. That they were contrary to the 1982 shareholders or joint shareholders agreement in that the resolutions were taken by the Lidchi group without any participation and consent by the Kahan group; and

19. That the resolutions were adopted for an unlawful purpose, namely to

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circumvent the consequences of the Respondent's sequestration.

Mr Bregman on the other hand contended that the 1982 agreement was abrogated by the parties. He referred the Court to the many instances where the parties were at loggerheads and submitted that none of the parties acted in terms of the 1982 agreement.

There is no doubt in my mind that if the 1982 agreement is still valid that the resolutions adopted on 22 June, 1997 were invalid. In terms of this agreement the parties agreed to exercise joint control over certain affected companies. The affected companies, in terms of clause 1.7 of the joint shareholders agreement, were defined as Offshore Diamonds and Moly Copper. See annexure "OMP. 9A." Certain other disqualifications were written in which are in my opinion'not relevant to the present proceedings. Clause 3.1.2 further stipulated that resolutions of directors of the affected companies, or their subsidiaries, would not be effective unless agreed to by directors nominated by the Kahan group and Directors nominated by the Lidchi group. Diamond Dredging and Lorelei are subsidiaries of the two affected companies as Offshore Diamonds owns 93,41% of the issued shares in Diamond Dredging and Moly Copper owns 99,65% of the issued shares in Lorelei.

One looks in vain for any allegations that the 1982 joint shareholders agreement was cancelled by one or other of the parties. That there were

occasions when one or other of the parties breached the agreement may be so

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but there is no indication on the documents that as a result thereof the agreement was cancelled by any of the parties. If there was such a cancellation it would have been the easiest thing to allege. Given the background of mistrust and suspicion one would expect also that such an important step would be documented. No such document seems to be in existence.

Various other grounds were set out in Respondent's answering affidavit as to why the Court should regard the 1982 joint shareholders agreement as non­existent. None of these grounds were argued or relied upon by Mr. Bregman and in my opinion they were without substance. I therefor conclude that the 1982 agreement was not terminated and that when the resolutions were taken on 22 June, 1997 they were taken in breach of this agreement and are therefor invalid.

I am furthermore satisfied that the trend of these resolutions and the way in which they were obtained, as well as various other factors such as the Respondent's stance that she is domiciled in Namibia, that she is virtually without any assets etc., were such that Applicants had every reason to view the situation with distrust and apprehension and they were therefor entitled to ask the Court for an interim interdict to safeguard the rights of the creditors in the estate of the Respondent pending the determination of those interests and rights. In my opinion these resolutions were clearly calculated to prepare the

ground for unilateral action on the part of the Respondent to deal with the

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assets of the companies in a way which could be detrimental to the interests of creditors in her insolvent estate.

4. COSTS

Mr Rubens submitted that the Court should grant the cost of two instructed counsel on a scale as between client and own Attorney. Mr. Rubens submitted that the Respondent made unfounded and serious allegations against the Applicants, Kahan and others. It was furthermore argued that the Respondent, not being insolvent as far as Namibia is concerned, should be ordered to pay the costs and that it would not be fair to saddle the estate and the creditors with such costs.

Mr Bregman submitted that there was no reason why the Court should order the Respondent to pay costs on a client and attorney scale and that the costs should be born by the estate.

In my opinion the Respondent by making irrelevant allegations and going into issues not really related to the relief claimed opened the door for the Applicants to come back with a full scale attack and a replying affidavit which, together with annexures consisted of some 531 pages, and the whole application developed into a battle between Respondent and Kahan and which ended in nothing less than a raking up of past and present wrongdoings and accusations of injustices committed by the one against the other. No restraint was exercised by either party and it was more particularly the Respondent Who made reckless and serious allegations of dishonesty and thievery against Kahan and others. In one instance I counted the use of no less than five adjectives describing Kahan. The Applicants and the Respondent must take the blame for this situation and the fact that there may or may not be an application for the removal of the Applicants as provisional trustees is not in my opinion a good reason why the Applicants should have entered into the arena. I am therefor not going to grant an order that the costs be paid on an attorney and client or own client scale. I however also do not see reason why under these circumstances the costs should be bom in toto by the estate, and hence the creditors. It would in my opinion be fair to order the Respondent, who has assets in Namibia and who is not insolvent as far as Namibia is concerned, to pay the costs of the Application. Mr. Bregman conceded that this was an instance where the Court could grant costs for two instructed Counsel.

In the result the following order is made:

20. Paragraphs 4.1 and 4.3 of the Rule Nisi issued by this Court on the 8th September, 1997 are hereby confirmed and it is specifically hereby declared that 1,276,852 Offshore Diamond shares, 2002 Diamond Dredging Shares, 13332 Moly Copper shares and 747 Lorelei shares vest in the Applicants.

21. The Respondent is ordered to pay the Applicants costs which costs shall include the costs of two instructed Counsel.

STRYDOM, J.P.