Mr. Murorua represents the applicant and Mr. Heathcote the respondents.
 I need not dwell too much on the first prayer. In his submission, Mr. Murorua conceded that the respondents have made out a case for the granting of the order prayed for. Indeed, on the papers, I am satisfied that the respondents explained fully why in their view the matter could not proceed (on 6 November 2006). Consequently, the respondents’ application should succeed. The result is that the question that remains to be determined is the issue of costs, that is, which party should be ordered to pay costs of this application.
 The respondents have prayed in the alternative with regard to costs, namely, that the applicant be ordered to pay costs of this application, or alternatively that the issue of costs should stand over for argument. I am minded to determine the issue now: there are sufficient facts before me upon which to exercise my discretion, and I see no reason for postponing a decision.
 Mr. Heathcote argued that the applicant had been warned that in all probability an application for postponement would in the circumstances be granted and, therefore, the applicant should agree postponement without the necessity of bringing a formal application to the Court, and that if the applicant had adopted a reasonable attitude the respondents would not have found it necessary to bring this application. For this reason, he submitted, the applicant should be ordered to pay the costs of this application.
 Mr. Murorua, on the other hand, argued that the applicant should be awarded costs because the usual rule is that the party at whose instance the postponement is obtained must pay the wasted costs. Apart from relying on the general rule, which undoubtedly supports the applicant’s position, Mr. Murorua argued further thus: by being given a trial date by the Registrar, the applicant had acquired a procedural right and if the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, grants the respondents’ application, which, in effect, would take away that right, then the respondents who applied to the Court to take away that right, so to speak, must be ordered to pay costs. Mr. Heathcote’s response was simply this: the applicant cannot insist on a right and gain from it if such right was obtained improperly.
 In my opinion, the above-mentioned usual rule being a general rule is open to qualifications: there may be rationes for not awarding costs in accordance with the general rule. And whether or not there is a reason or reasons for not applying the usual rule will depend principally on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In this connection, the principal facts and circumstances, which I keep in view, are the following: