It seems obvious to me that Mr Mokhatu’s submission rests on Gauiseb’scase, There is, however, a sharp contrast between that case, which had to do with Rule 23(1), and the present case which relates to Rule 30(5). The contrast is readily discernible in that the proviso to Rule 23(1) is couched in peremptory terms whereas Rule 30(5) is not. In terms of subrule (5), a party that invokes Rule 30 against another party should give notice to his opponent to afford him an opportunity to remove the cause of complaint within ten days of becoming aware of the irregularity. Although the subrule is not peremptory, it should, nevertheless be complied with for the reason that non-compliance will, in the ordinary course, result in an award of costs against the defaulting party and probably a dismissal of the application. One of the purposes of the subrule is to prevent unnecessary applications being brought and to put a defaulting party on notice as to the consequences of his default. See: and Others v Fhirer & Son1982 (3) SA 353 at 361A–B. In an appropriate case, however, the court can condone non-compliance with the requirement. See: ’scase, at 360G – 361B. Anyhow, in the question of condoning the respondent’s non-compliance with subrule (5) of Rule 30 does not arise in the absence of an application for condonation.
The final issue for consideration is the respondent’s second Rule 30 application for an order that the applicant’s application aforesaid is an irregular proceeding which falls to be set aside. This application, which has seemingly been brought out of a lack of appreciation of the full import of Rule 30, is also irregular, unnecessary and utterly misconceived. It is wholly uncalled for, and even vexatious, for a party to launch a multiplicity of similar interlocutory applications before the first one is ventilated and disposed of. In any event, the findings pertaining to the respondent’s first application are equally applicable to the second one. Consequently, the respondent will be unable to escape the consequences of its conduct.
Under the circumstances, the following order is made:
The applicant’s Rule 30 application is upheld.
The respondent’s first Rule 30 application filed on April 10, 2008, is hereby declared an irregular proceeding and is, therefore, set aside with costs.
The respondent’s second Rule 30 application of May 14, 2008, is misconceived and irregular; accordingly, it is also set aside with costs.