
Vexatious Proceedings Act, 1956
Act 3 of 1956
- Published in South African Government Gazette 5632 on 17 February 1956
- Assented to on 6 February 1956
- Commenced on 17 February 1956
- [This is the version of this document from 17 February 1956 and includes any amendments published up to 6 June 2025.]
1. Definitions
In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates -“court” means any provincial or local division of the Supreme Court of South Africa and includes the High Court of South-West Africa;“State Attorney” means the officer appointed under paragraph (a) of sub-section (2) of section two of the State Attorney Act, 1925 (Act No. 25 of 1925).[The State Attorney Act 25 of 1925 (SA) was replaced by the State Attorney Act 56 of 1957 (SA) (SA GG 5894), which was replaced in South West Africa by the RSA Government Attorney Proclamation, R.161 of 1982 (RSA GG 8367). This Proclamation converts the Windhoek branch of the Office of the State Attorney in Pretoria into the Government Attorney’s Office for the Territory of South West Africa. It was brought into force on 1 April 1984 by RSA Proc. 52 /1984 (RSA GG 9162).]2. Powers of court to impose restrictions on the institution of vexatious legal proceedings
3. Application of Act to South-West Africa
This Act shall apply also in the territory of South-West Africa.4. Short title
This Act shall be called the Vexatious Proceedings Act, 1956.History of this document
17 February 1956 this version
06 February 1956
Cited documents 0
Documents citing this one 3
Judgment
3
This is an appeal from the court a quo wherein the appellants brought an application to declare rule 31(5)(a) of the repealed rules of the High Court unconstitutional and declare the default judgment granted by the registrar under rule 31(5)(a) invalid and null and void.
During or about 2001, Erf 4479, Khomasdal, Windhoek, was declared specially executable by the registrar of the High Court, who was empowered to do so by the now repealed rules of the High Court. Subsequently, the property was sold in execution on 24 March 2005 to Mr and Mrs Benade. During 2005 the first application was brought, seeking to set aside the sale in execution.
After that, the application by the appellants was dismissed in March 2006, the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, but as a result of the non-compliance on the part of the appellants, the Supreme Court struck the application and the appeal was further not prosecuted.
During the year 2011, the appeal was declared to have lapsed. Successively, during or about 2013/2014 the appellants sought similar relief from the High Court, whereby, the Court dismissed the appellants’ application.
That is the background upon which this current appeal of the whole judgment of the Court a quo is premised.
Held that, the functus officio principle lends finality to the conduct of proceedings by marking a definitive endpoint to it.
Held that, the High Court does not have the authority to review or overturn its own decisions, nor does it have appellate jurisdiction over its own decisions.
Held that, the learned judge's finding that there was an unreasonable delay in launching the applications is sound.
Held that, the judge a quo correctly held that the High Court had fully and finally exercised its jurisdiction and could not alter or correct its order even with the benefit of hindsight.
Held that, one recognised exception to the functus principle is the rescission of a judgment, and the appellants did not apply for rescission of the judgment.
Held that, the High Court is functus officio in respect of the dispute between the appellants and the respondents.
Held further that, time is even more of the essence in a case where a constitutional challenge is launched concerning the constitutionality of a statute or rules of court.
Held that, if the appellants were aggrieved with the conduct of the respective legal practitioners, which they clearly are, they have recourse to the Body to which legal practitioners are accountable, ie the Law Society of Namibia.
Held further that, launching a personal attack on legal practitioners who are merely representing their clients and pursuing their mandate is unacceptable.
Held that, there is no reason to shield the appellants from a cost order in this appeal, and there is no basis for deviating from the normal rule that the costs should follow the result.
Held that, the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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