REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NAMIBIA, MAIN DIVISION, WINDHOEK
PRACTICE DIRECTIVE 61
Case Title: Lydia Kandjimbi Plaintiff and Phillemon Joseph 1st Defendant Juliana Roeder 2ND Defendant The Masters of the High Court of Namibia 3RD Defendant The Registrar of Deeds 4TH Defendant The Magistrate for the District of Usakos 5TH Defendant | Case No: HC-MD-CIV-ACT-OTH-2020/04258 | |
Division of Court: Main Division | ||
Heard on: 6 March 2023 | ||
Heard before: Honourable Lady Justice Rakow | Delivered on: 13 June 2023 | |
Neutral citation: Kandjimbi v Joseph (HC-MD-CIV-ACT-OTH-2020/04258) [2023] NAHCMD 314 (13 June 2023) | ||
Order: | ||
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Reasons for order: | ||
RAKOW J Introduction
History
The claim
The evidence For the plaintiff
For the defendants
The arguments
Issues for determination
Legal considerations
‘18. Succession (1) All movable property belonging to a Native and allotted by him or accruing under native law or custom to any woman with whom he lived in a customary union, or to any house, shall upon his death devolve and be administered under native law and custom. (2) All other property of whatsoever kind belonging to a Native shall be capable of being devised by will. Any such property not so devised shall devolve and be administered according to native law and custom.’
‘[36] It is common cause that the deceased as well as the parties to the present proceedings are black persons. It is further common cause that the deceased and the respondent were married out of community of property. As outlined herein before, when I dealt with the historically statutory provisions of intestate succession amongst various ethnic groups in Namibia, it emerged that intestate succession in respect of black persons has been regulated by the provisions of the Native Administration Proclamation, 1928. My finding is that the provisions of the Intestate Succession Ordinance, 1946, never regulated intestate succession in respect of black persons, but only regulated and still regulates interstate succession in respect of white persons. [37] It is argued on behalf of the respondent that since sections 18(1), (2), (9) and (10) of the Native Administration Proclamtion,1928 and the Regulations published in GN 70 of 1954 have been repealed, the statutes regulating the intestate succession of the deceased’s estate in the present matter are the Intestate Succession Ordinance, 1946 and the Intestate Succession Amendment Act, 2005. [38] The respondent’s argument is premised on the incorrect reading of the Intestate Succession Amendment Act, 2005 in that, that Act did not repeal the Regulations promulgated in Government Notice 70 of 1954. This is because subsection 1 of section 1 the Act reads: ‘Section 18 of the Native Administration Proclamation, 1928 is amended by the repeal of subsections (1), (2), (9) and (10).’ No mention is made of the Regulation published in GN 70 1954 having been repealed. As a matter of fact, the said Regulations are still on the statute book. [39] It is further clear, in my view, from the reading of section 2 of the Intestate Succession Amendment Act, 2005 that Act retained and did not repeal the rules of intestate succession in respect of estates of black persons. In this connection section 2 reads: ‘Despite the repeal of the provisions referred to in subsection (1), the rules of intestate succession that applied by virtue of those provisions before the date of their repeal continue to be of force in relation to persons to whom the relevant rules would have been applicable had the said provisions not been repealed’. [40] It follows therefore, in my view, that from the reading of the provisions of section 2 of the Intestate Succession Amendment Act, 2005, the intestate succession Regulations which apply to intestate succession estates of deceased black persons, are still applicable. [41] There is a further reason why the argument advanced on behalf of the first respondent cannot be sustained. This is: the Estates and Succession Amendment Act, 2005 which repealed subsections (1), (2), (9) and (10) of the Native Administration Proclamation, 1928, did not stipulate that since those provisions have been repealed, the provisions of the Intestate Succession Ordinance, 1946 will hence forth apply to all intestate successions in the Republic. It thus fair to conclude that had the Legislature intended that the provisions of the Intestate Succession Ordinance,1946 would apply to the estates of black persons following the repeal of the aforesaid subsection of the Native Administration Proclamation,1928, it would have said so in clear and precise language. As matters stand, the first respondent’s argument that the provisions of the Intestate Succession Ordinance, 1946 apply to the deceased estates of all persons in the Republic and thus to the estates of the deceased in the present matter, is not supported by any evidence or law. It is baseless and is liable to be rejected. I proceed to apply the intestate succession rules published in GN 70 of 1954 to the facts of the present matter. [42] As regards the provisions of regulation 2(a)(i) of the regulation published in GN 70 of 1954, it is common cause that the deceased, at the time of his death was not a partner in a marriage in community of property or under ante-nuptial contract. Section 17(6) of the Native Administration Proclamation, 1928, provides that the marriage between black persons solemnised north of the Police Zone is automatically out of community of property. The deceased and the respondent were married at Engela in the Ohangwena Region, which is situated north of the Police Zone. This regulation 2(a)(i) therefore does not apply to the present matter. [43] As far as the provisions of regulation 2(a)(ii) are concerned, it is common cause that the deceased was not at the time of his death a widower or divorcee, of a marriage in community of property or under an ante-nuptial contract and was not survived by a partner to a customary union entered into subsequent to such marriage. Accordingly, his estate cannot devolve as if he were a white person and thus the provisions of the Intestate Succession Ordinance, 1946 do not apply to the deceased’s estate in the present matter. [44] Lastly, as regards the provisions of regulation 2(b) it is common cause that the deceased does not fall in any of the classes stipulated in regulation 1(i) or (ii). It follows therefore that the deceased estate ‘shall be distributed according to native law and custom’ as per regulation 2(b). [45] In the light of the conclusion I have arrived at, as regard to applicable law, it follows as a matter of law that the estate of the deceased is to be administered and distributed according to customary law as stipulated by regulation 2(b) of the Regulations published in GN 70 of 1954. I proceed to consider the respondent’s alternative argument. [46] The respondent argues, in the alternative, that if it is found by this Court, that the provisions of the Intestate Succession Ordinance, 1946 are not applicable to the deceased’s estate in the present matter, then in that event, it is submitted, the applicant has failed to provide a prima facie proof of the inheritance lineage of his family. [47] Professor Amoo in his book2 Property Law in Namibia, correctly, in my view, points out that the customary rules on intestate succession are different from community to community, depending on whether a particular community follows a matrilineal or patrilineal system of succession. It follows therefore that with regard to immovable property, the rights of a widow of such marriage will be determined by the relevant customary law. [48] It is a matter of record and general knowledge that the Ovambo community, to which the parties in this matter belong, follows a matrilineal system. Historian Martti Eirola, a Finnish missionary who was born and bred in what was then Ovamboland states in his book, The Ovambogefahr; the Owamboland Reservation in the Making (1992) about the intestate succession amongst the Ovambo traditional community at page 41 as follows: ‘There was no common property within the household, but everything was divided between the master, his wives and his fully-grown children. When a man died, his wives and children inherited nothing from him, but the property returned matrilineally to his clan. Correspondingly, a man has no right to his wife’s property, as it belonged to her clan.’ [49] In my view the facts of the present matter support what Eirola says in his book. This is demonstrated by the fact that the property was allocated by the family members to the deceased’s mother and not to the deceased paternal uncles. This fact is further demonstrated by the fact that before the deceased’s mother died it was agreed between the applicant and the deceased’s mother and the members of the family of the applicant that the applicant, as a maternal cousin to the deceased, would inherit the property. [50] I have therefore arrived at the conclusion that there is sufficient evidence before this Court which proves that the applicant’s family lineage follows the matrilineal rules of inheritance. The respondent not being related to the deceased in any degree of consanguinity, as Eirola states, in terms of the rules of intestate succession of the Ovambo, has no right to inherit from her deceased husband.’
‘Evidence was tendered concerning the alleged Herero customary law and considerable time was spent in canvassing this issue and questioning the qualifications of the persons who tendered the evidence. Mr Botha contented that customary law should be proved by qualified experts in the same manner as foreign law. It seems to me, however, that in so far as Herero customary law might be applicable, such law is part of the law of South West Africa of which the Court can take judicial notice; consequently it need not be proved in the same manner as foreign law. In the process of taking such judicial cognisance this Court may inform itself from history books. (See the remarks of Fagan CJ in Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa Ltd v Administrator, SWA, and Another 1958 (4) SA 572 (A) at 610A.).’ Conclusion
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Judge’s signature | Note to the parties: | |
E RAKOW Judge | Not applicable | |
Counsel: | ||
Plaintiff: | 1st and 2nd Defendant: | |
K Amoomo Of Kadhila Amoomo Legal Practitioners, Windhoek | E Nangolo Of Sisa Namandje & Co. Inc., Windhoek |
1 Gabriel v Nehemia (HC-MD-CIV-MOT-GEN-2018/00367) [2019] NAHCMD 564 (6 December 2019).
2 Amoo SK: Property Law in Namibia 2014 at page 214-215.
3 Kaputuaza v Executive Committee of the Administration for the Hereros and Others 1984 (4) 295.