REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NAMIBIA, MAIN DIVISION, WINDHOEK
RULING
Practice Directive 61
Case Title: Schameerah Seven (7) Reg: CC/2003/1053 1st Applicant Schameerah Four (4) Reg: CC/2003/2211 2nd Applicant Daniel Kudumo Kamunoko ID No: 72120100225 3rd Applicant Elvis Bongani Ndala ID No: 640502 5883 088 4th Applicant and Standard Bank Namibia Limited (Windhoek) Reg: 78/10799 1st Respondent Directors Of Standard Bank Namibia Limited 2nd Respondent Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Standard Bank 3rd Respondent Nolen Christian Standard Bank Recovery Department 4th Respondent Dr Weder, Kauta & Hoveka Inc. 5th Respondent L. Hangula (Only Well Known By Standard Bank) 6th Respondent John Nujoma Nangola 7th Respondent Minister Of Justice (As The Interested Party) 8th Respondent | Case No: HC-MD-CIV-MOT-GEN-2021/00304 | |
Division of Court: Main Division | ||
Heard: 7 June 2023 | ||
Heard before: Honourable Lady Justice Rakow | Delivered: 28 June 2023 | |
Neutral citation: Schameerah Seven (7) Reg: CC/2003/1053 v Standard Bank Namibia Limited (Windhoek) Reg: 78/10799 (HC-MD-CIV-MOT-GEN-2021/00304) [2023] NAHCMD 358 (28 June 2023) | ||
Order: | ||
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Reasons for order: | ||
RAKOW J Introduction
Arguments
The court order of 1 February 2022
Legal considerations for above order
‘It is clear that the rule limiting representation of a corporate entity to legal practitioners is not inflexible. In Arbuthnot Leasing International Ltd v Havelet Leasing Ltd & others2 , while accepting that the normal rule was that a body corporate must appear by counsel or solicitor, the court recognised that in certain exceptional circumstances, a director who is a party to litigation to which a company is also a party may be allowed to appear in person for purposes which are also those of the company.’
‘. . . a court should be entitled, in an appropriate case and to avoid injustice, to allow at least a one-person company to be represented at a court hearing by its alter ego. The learned judge said that the inconvenience caused to the court as a result of an unqualified person appearing before it had to be weighed up against the injustice of a juristic person being denied access to the courts.’
‘[25] In the consideration of the application by natural persons seeking to represent the corporation it is therefore of crucial importance to establish the status of such persons in order to determine whether they have the status and authority which in law makes their acts, intentions and knowledge those of the company so as to treat them as the company itself.’
Recusal
Onus and what needs to be shown in a recusal application
‘The departure point is that a judicial officer is presumed to be impartial in adjudicating disputes and that the presumption is not easily dislodged. A mere apprehension of bias is therefore not sufficient to rebut the presumption.’
‘The test for recusal is “whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the correct facts reasonably apprehended that the Judge has not or will not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case. The test is “objective and … the onus of establishing it rests on the applicant.’
‘First, the test is whether the reasonable, objective and informed person would on the correct facts reasonably apprehend that the Judge will not be impartial. Secondly, the test is an objective one. The requirement is described in the SARFU and SACCAWU cases as one of 'double reasonableness'. Not only must the person apprehending the bias be a reasonable person in the position of the applicant for recusal but the apprehension must also be reasonable. Moreover, apprehension that the Judge may be biased is not enough. What is required is an apprehension, based on reasonable grounds, that the Judge will not be impartial. Thirdly, there is a built-in presumption that, particularly since Judges are bound by a solemn oath of office to administer justice without fear or favour, they will be impartial in adjudicating disputes. As a consequence, the applicant for recusal bears the onus of rebutting the weighty presumption of judicial impartiality. As was pointed out by Cameron AJ in the SACCAWU case (para [15]) the purpose of formulating the test as one of 'double-reasonableness' is to emphasise the weight of the burden resting on the appellant for recusal. Fourthly, what is required of a Judge is judicial impartiality and not complete neutrality. It is accepted that Judges are human and that they bring their life experiences to the Bench. They are not expected to divorce themselves from these experiences and to become judicial stereotypes. What Judges are required to be is impartial, that is, to approach the matter with a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel.’
‘. . . The principles applicable to recusal were, with respect, recently succinctly summarised by the South African Constitutional Court in Bernert v Absa Bank14 in the following way: “The apprehension of bias may arise either from the association or interest that the judicial officer has in one of the litigants before the court or from the interest that the judicial officer has in the outcome of the case. Or it may arise from the conduct or utterances by a judicial officer prior to or during proceedings. In all these situations, the judicial officer must ordinarily recuse himself or herself. The apprehension of bias principle reflects the fundamental principle of our Constitution that courts must be independent and impartial.13 And fundamental to our judicial system is that courts must not only be independent and impartial, but they must be seen to be independent and impartial.’ Discussion
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Judge’s signature | Note to the parties: | |
E RAKOW Judge | Not applicable | |
Counsel: | ||
Applicant(s): | First – Third Respondent(s): | |
Mr Elvis Bongani Ndala Mr Daniel Kudumo Kamunoko (both plaintiffs – in person) Windhoek | Ms M Kuzeeko Of Dr Weder, Kauta & Hoveka Inc. Windhoek |
1 Navy Two CC and Industrial Zone Limited; Supreme Court Case no: 293/2004; delivered: 28/9/2005
2 [1991] 1 ALL ER (CH D), at 597 to 598 a-h 599 a e g.
3 California Spice Marinade (Pty) Ltd and others in re: Bankorp v California Spice and Marinade (Pty) Ltd v others; Fair O’Rama Property Investments CC v others; Tsaperas; and Tsaperas [1997] ALL SA 317 (W).
4 Nationwide Detectives and Professional Practitioners CC v Standard Bank of Namibia Limited (SA 32/2007) 2008 (1) NR 290 (SC).
5 Ibid, at page 1 and 2.
6 Arma Carpet House (Johannesburg) (Pty) Ltd v Domestic and Commercial Carpet Fittings (Pty) Ltd and Another 1977 (3) SA 448 (W).
7 Lees Import and Export (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1999 (4) SA 1119 (ZSC).
8 Minister of Finance and Another v Hollard Insurance Co of Namibia Ltd and Others 2019 (3) NR 605 (SC) para 25.
9 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others (CCT16/98) [1999] ZACC 11; 2000 (1) SA 1; 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (10 September 1999)
10 S v Shackell 2001 (4) SA 1 (SCA
11 Supra.
12 South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Others v Irvin & Johnson Ltd (Seafoods Division Fish Processing) 2000 (3) SA 705 (CC) D (2000 (8) BCLR 886) ('the SACCAWU case')
13 Januarie v Registrar of High Court & others (I 396/2009) [2013] NAHCMD 170 (19 June 2013) paragraphs 16 to 20.
14 Bernert v Absa Bank 2011 (3) SA 92 (CC).