“ANNEXURE 11”
REPORTABLE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NAMIBIA
Case Title: HOLLARD INSURANCE COMPANY OF NAMIBIA & 11 OTHERS vs MINISTER OF FINANCE & ANOTHER | Case No: HC-MD-CIV-MOT-REV-2018/00127 | |
Division of Court: HIGH COURT (MAIN DIVISION) | ||
Heard before: HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE GEIER | Date reserved: 09 JUNE 2020 | |
Delivered on: 24 JUNE 2020 | ||
Neutral citation: Hollard Insurance Company of Namibia v Minister of Finance (HC-MD-CIV-MOT-REV-2018/00127) [2020] NAHCMD 247 (24 June 2020) | ||
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
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Following below are the reasons for the above order: | ||
Introductory facts
The procedural issue – application for leave to appeal brought on ‘notice of application’ and not on ‘notice of motion’ supported by affidavit
The consideration of the merits of the application for leave to appeal
The consideration of the possible impact of the interests of justice on the application
‘ … Furthermore, the interests of justice dictate that an appeal lies to the Supreme Court. The judgment has far-reaching implications for the scope and application of Rule 76 in future judicial reviews…’.
‘16. The applicants do not agree that this is a principle in the determination of the first leg – the threshold enquiry – in an application for leave to appeal in Namibia, which is whether the orders are appealable at all. The interests of justice may be relevant in the second leg of the enquiry, when a court must determine whether leave to appeal should be granted against orders that are appealable. This alleged principle is holus bolus an importation of the South African principles and its legislation. It may have been a bona fide mistake, but it is wrong.17. The Namibian authorities6 on which the first respondent relies do not establish or support the proposition that the interests of justice are relevant to the threshold enquiry. In paragraph 5 of Von Weidts, the court merely referenced the cited and then – recent SCA judgment in considering the propriety of a litigant presenting a constitutional argument on appeal for the first time, without having raised it in the court of first instance. And in Lameck, paragraphs 10 and 11 dealt with the interest of justice on the second leg of the enquiry. But, as we have already submitted, this mistake may have crept in because of the erroneous assumption that South African legislation is applicable here.’
‘38. Moreover, one of the primary policy reasons for the reluctance to allow appeals on interlocutory matters which do not have a definite effect on the rights between the parties, is the importance attached to avoiding piecemeal litigation.7 In the present case, the interests of justice require that this matter not be adjudicated on a piecemeal basis. The pleadings in this case, and what is common knowledge about the extent of litigation between the parties on the issues to be decided in this review, make plain that this is not a case where the court should await a decision by the Supreme Court on a matter that is neither definitive of the rights of the parties nor disposes of at least a substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main proceedings. Reviews must be instituted without undue delay, for reasons well known. For the same reasons review applications should be finalised without delay.39. The first respondent’s concern that other courts will be bound by this court’s decision is a strange concern. Since when, we respectfully ask, is the stare decisis principle a factor to be taken into consideration in an application for leave to appeal. Of course, other courts must follow the ratio of this case where applicable on the facts. And it is a good thing at that. Furthermore, the interests of justice cannot only focus on “other” potential litigants, or on the general public, but must also consider and balance the interests of the parties to the present case and the significance of the issues at stake in the main application. In the present case, the orders which the court granted on 21 January 2020 merely regulate the conduct of litigation and do not dispose of any of the issues in the review, launched in April 2018. All of the issues in the review are yet to be determined.40. In addition, the court did not reinterpret Rule 76(6) or Rule 53. The court in effect simply applied the principles established long ago in the celebrated case of Johannesburg City Council and confirmed in Namibia in Aonin Fishing already in 1998. When the first respondent’s complaints are closely examined, it is clear that his complaints are directed to the High Court’s application of those principles, and to the High Court’s application of its common sense. While it is indeed so that the court also relied on the Helen Suzman Foundation case, it did so primarily to support its application of the principles gleaned from Johannesburg City Council and Aonin Fishing, and its common sense. The court’s reliance for guidance on Helen Suzman Foundation does not make it in interests of justice for the review (which is not relevant to the threshold enquiry anyway) to be postponed to 2022, which would be the inevitable result if the matter is to proceed to the Supreme Court. In any event, the first respondent cannot seriously suggest - and he also does not do so - that the Namibian Supreme Court will find that Helen Suzman Foundation was wrongly and should not be followed in Namibia. … 63. In the premises the conclusions in paragraph 40 are incorrect. There is no need, in the interest of justice or in the public interest, for the current litigation between the parties to be stopped mid-stream to await the determination of an appeal, and only resume in 2022.’
‘ … it is clearly in the interests of justice that leave to appeal is granted. The proper construction of Rule 76(6) is not only of importance to the parties but of significant public importance given its application to all future judicial reviews.8 In this regard, this Court’s findings inter alia as to the application of the South African Constitutional Court’s judgment in Helen Suzman Foundation9, and its findings as to the scope of Rule 76(6), are matters which merit the attention of the Supreme Court.’
‘ … Moreover, the matter raises important questions about the proper construction of Rule 76 and the obligations on decision-makers (and the rights of litigants) in all future judicial reviews. Rule 76 lies at the heart of the very important remedy of judicial review: it is clearly in the public interest for the validity of the new ground broken by the Court’s judgment in this matter to be pronounced upon by the highest Court.’
‘ … Although interests of justice is generally an important consideration to determine whether leave to appeal must be granted, we respectfully submit that there is nothing which precludes this Court from considering interests of justice in determining whether an order is appealable or not. In any event, such an approach is consistent with comparative jurisdiction.10 We accordingly invite the Court to take it into account.’
‘[39] The appealability of interim orders in terms of the common law depends on whether they are final in effect.12 … [40] The common-law test for appealability has since been denuded of its somewhat inflexible nature. Unsurprisingly so because the common law is not on par with but subservient to the supreme law that prescribes the interests of justice as the only requirement to be met for the grant of leave to appeal. Unlike before13 appealability no longer depends largely on whether the interim order appealed against has final effect or is dispositive of a substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main application. All this is now subsumed under the constitutional interests of justice standard. The overarching role of interests of justice considerations has relativised the final effect of the order or the disposition of the substantial portion of what is pending before the review court, in determining appealability.14 The principle was set out in OUTA by Moseneke DCJ in these terms: 'This court has granted leave to appeal in relation to interim orders before. It has made it clear that the operative standard is the interests of justice. To that end, it must have regard to and weigh carefully all germane circumstances. Whether an interim order has a final effect or disposes of a substantial portion of the relief sought in a pending review is a relevant and important consideration. Yet, it is not the only or always decisive consideration. It is just as important to assess whether the temporary restraining order has an immediate and substantial effect, including whether the harm that flows from it is serious, immediate, ongoing and irreparable.'15 ….. [41] What the role of interests of justice is in this kind of application, again entails the need to ensure that form never trumps any approach that would advance the interests of justice. If appealability or the grant of leave to appeal would best serve the interests of justice, then the appeal should be proceeded with no matter what the pre-Constitution common-law impediments might suggest. This is especially so where, as in this case, the interim order should not have been granted in the first place by reason of a failure to meet the requirements. The Constitution and our law are all about real justice, not mere formalities. Importantly, the constitutional prescripts of legality and the rule of law demand that nobody, not even a court of law, exercises powers they do not have. Where separation of powers is implicated and forbids the grant of the order sought to be appealed against, the interests of justice demand that even an order that is not of final effect or does not dispose of a substantial portion of the issues in the main application, nevertheless be appealable. [42] Consequently, although the final effect of the interim order or the disposition of a substantial portion of issues in the main application is not irrelevant to the determination of appealability and the grant of leave, they are in terms of our constitutional jurisprudence hardly ever determinative of appealability or leave.16 …’.
‘[20] Accordingly what must be disclosed is all information relevant to the impugned decision as otherwise the provisions of Rule 76 would be rendered meaningless. The Rule in any event requires this in express terms. The rule also clearly envisages the grounds of review changing later. ‘Relevance’ should thus be assessed as it relates to the decision sought to be reviewed, not with reference to the case pleaded originally in the founding affidavit. In this regard it can thus be said that, what must be disclosed - and it is here that I would think that the material change comes in - are all those ‘ … documents/materials that could have any tendency, in reason, to establish any possible/potential review ground in relation to the decision to be reviewed, ie. all materials relevant to the exercise of the public power in question …’. It follows - and I thus uphold the submission - that the word ‘relevance’ as used in Rule 76(6) is ‘wide(r) in its scope and meaning’ in these respects. The concept thus differs in its scope and the way and from how it is applied in action- and also in motion proceedings in general. It is thus also not limited only to the actual material serving before the decision-maker but it so also includes all material available to the decision-maker – whether considered or not – for as long as it is relevant to the decision to be reviewed - and in any event it includes the material that is incorporated by reference. In this regard it was thus correctly submitted that ‘an applicant in a review will be entitled to documents that are relevant to the case pleaded in the founding affidavit, and/or(my insertion) to any other information that relates to the decision sought to be reviewed even if the relevance does not specifically appear from the pleadings’. ‘
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Judge’s signature | Note to the parties: | |
Not applicable. | ||
Counsel: | ||
Applicant | Respondents | |
JJ Gauntlett SC QC LC Kelly E Nekwaya Instructed by Sisa Namandje & Co. Inc. | R Heathcote SC R Maasdorp Instructed by Francois Erasmus & Partners |
1 See Namibia Water Corporation Ltd v Tjipangandjara at [15].
2 See Rule 115(1).
3 As required in this instance by Rule 115(2).
4 Compare in this regard for instance Rules 61(1) and (2) See also: Veldman and Another v Bester 2011 (2) NR 581 (HC) at [18] to [25] (under the old rules) and Namibia Competition Commission v Namib Mills (Pty) Ltd (HC-MD-CIV-MOT-GEN-2017/00061) [2019] 465 (7 November 2019) (under the new rules).
5 Save possibly for those relating to the Court order under paragraph 4 which relate to the preceding interpretation of the concept ‘possession’ as used in Rule 76(6) and the resultant qualified order for the production of materials possibly not in the possession of the Minister.
6 Von Weidts v Minister of Lands and Resettlement and Another 2016 (2) NR 500 (HC) at par 5 with reference to Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v Southern Africa Litigation Centre and Others 2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA) at par 24; Lameck v State (CC 15/2015) [2014] NAHCMD 85 (10 April 2015) at par 10 and 11.
7 Hollard at par 9 (quoting par 20 of Shetu):
“There are important reasons for preventing appeals on rulings. In Knouwds NO v Josea and Another, this court cited with approval the following remarks of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Guardian National Insurance Co Ltd v Searle NO,
'There are still sound grounds for a basic approach which avoids the piecemeal appellate disposal of the issues in litigation. It is unnecessarily expensive and generally it is desirable for obvious reasons, that such issues be resolved by the same court and at one and the same time.' As the court in Guardian National Insurance went on to note, one of the risks of permitting appeals on orders that are not final in effect, is that it could result in two appeals on the same issue which would be 'squarely in conflict' with the need to avoid piecemeal appeals.”
And at par 28:
This approach would at the same time - and to borrow a phrase - also ‘prevent the parties from yo-yoing up and down the courts’ and which approach would also prevent, at the same time, the piecemeal- appellate adjudication of issues in the litigation, pending before the lower court, which would also achieve a cost- and time saving effect, which course would also avoid the potential possibility of two appeals, on the same issue.
8 Lameck supra para 10.
9 Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission 2018 (4) SA 1 (CC).
10 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum 2016 (6) SA 279 (CC) at para 40 et seq. Lameck v State (CC 15/2015) [2014] NAHCMD 85 (10 April 2015) para 10 and 11.
11 Lameck v State (CC 15/2015) [2014] NAHCMD 85 (10 April 2015) at [10] – [11], Von Weidts v Minister of Lands and Resettlement and Another 2016 (2) NR 500 (HC) at [5].
12 OUTA above n3 para 24. (National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) (2012 (11) BCLR 1148; [2012] ZACC 18) (OUTA) ) See also Zweni v Minister of Law and Order 1993 (1) SA 523 (A) ([1992] ZASCA 197) (Zweni) at 532J – 533A, where the court stated that:
'(F)irst, the decision must be final in effect and not susceptible of alteration by the Court of first instance; second, it must be definitive of the rights of the parties; and, third, it must have the effect of disposing of at least a substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main proceedings.'
13 See Zweni above n9 at 532J – 533A.
14 South African Informal Traders Forum and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2014 (4) SA 371 (CC) (2014 (6) BCLR 726; [2014] ZACC 8) (Informal Traders) para 17 states:
'This provision [s 167(6) of the Constitution] makes it plain that the court has a wide appellate jurisdiction on constitutional matters. It may decide whether to hear an appeal from any court on any constitutional dispute provided it serves the interests of justice to do so. There is no pre-ordained divide between appealable and non-appealable issues. Provided a dispute relates to a constitutional matter, there is no general rule that prevents this court from hearing an appeal against an interlocutory decision such as the refusal of an interim interdict. However, it would be appealable only if the interests of justice so demand. Thus, this court would not without more agree to hear an appeal that impugns an interlocutory decision, especially because such a decision is open to reconsideration by the court that has granted it. Doing so would be an exception rather than the norm.'
15 OUTA above n3 para 25.
16 Id para 25.
17 Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd t/a American Express Travel Service 1996 (3) SA 1 (A) at 10F.
18 See for example : Shetu Trading CC v Chair, Tender Board of Namibia and Others 2012 (1) NR 162 (SC at [22].
19 : See for example : Prosecutor-General v Paulo and Another 2017 (1) NR 178 (HC) at [21} or Standard Bank of Namibia Ltd v Atlantic Meat Market 2014 (4) NR 1158 (SC) at [30].
20 Compare for example : Prosecutor-General v Paulo and Another 2017 (1) NR 178 (HC) at [21} or Standard Bank of Namibia Ltd v Atlantic Meat Market 2014 (4) NR 1158 (SC) at [30].
21 See for instance : Prosecutor-General v Paulo and Another 2017 (1) NR 178 (HC) at [21}.
22 Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission 2018 (4) SA 1 (CC).
23 See paragraph [11] of the Judgment of 21 January 2020.
24 See paragraph [12] of the Judgment of 21 January 2020.
25 See paragraph [13] of the Judgment of 21 January 2020.
26 See paragraphs [14] to [16] and [17] to of the Judgment of 21 January 2020.
27 See paragraph [11] of the Judgment of 21 January 2020.
1
Documents citing this one 3
Judgment 3
- Council of Municipality of Windhoek v Brandt (HC-MD-LAB-APP-AAA 3 of 2019) [2021] NAHCMD 39 (23 August 2021)
- Harases v Erongo Regional Electricity Distributors Company (Pty) Ltd (HC-MD-LAB-MOT-GEN 221 of 2020) [2022] NALCMD 38 (6 July 2022)
- Namibia Water Corporation Limited v Kuiri Fanual Tjipangandjara (SCR 1/2023) [2023] NASC 43 (22 November 2023)